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GLOBALIZING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: PRIVATE
LAW APPROACHES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
GERALD KORNGOLD*
For the past thirty years, nonprofit organizations have
revolutionized open space and habitat conservation in the United
States through the use of conservation easements. Pursuant to
legislation, nonprofits may now acquire and hold perpetual
restrictions that prevent alteration of the subject land's natural and
ecological features. These rights can be held "in gross," with the
result that the nonprofit need not own land near the restricted
property and can be based in a distant location.
Based on this success, proponents in more recent years
have advocated the export of "conservation easements" from the
United States to other countries. A vehicle like a conservation
easement, having some or even perhaps all of its attributes, could be
employed in other countries to achieve various local and national
conservation goals. My thesis, however, is that while conservation
easements could be a useful tool for preservation of land outside of
the United States, they may not be the most effective or suitable
framework to advance conservation in all countries. Rather than
pushing for adoption of an American-style "conservation easement"
elsewhere, other countries and American (and global) advocates of
conservation devices should engage in a process to determine a given
country's appropriate conservation toolbox. That process should be
free of American legal and conservation jargon and without a
predisposition for U.S. legal structures, values, and policy choices.
Each country must determine on its own whether private
conservation restrictions meet its economic, social, and political
realities and aspirations (many of which are quite different than the
American experience reflected in U.S. conservation easements) and
which attributes the device should have on key issues such as
duration, in gross enforcement, role of government, etc. These
national and local goals can then be given life by finding an
appropriate legal structure, ideally consistent with the country's own
jurisprudence and system.
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This article will provide a framework of the major policy
and legal issues that could, and in my view should, inform a
country's decision to adopt private conservation restrictions. These
include considerations of cost, efficiency, preference for private
versus governmental actors, the benefits and costs of perpetual limits
on land, public regulation of land as an alternative, the specter of
neocolonialism in environmental controls, the nature and capacity of
the country's nonprofit sector, and the local legal system. Finally, the
learning about conservation restrictions should be a two-way street,
not just the export of American methods: the views of some other
countries about governmental involvement in private conservation
may teach valuable lessons to U.S. jurisdictions about the need for an
increased role of government and the public in certain aspects of the
selection, modification, and termination of some conservation
easements.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past thirty years, nonprofit organizations have
revolutionized open space and habitat conservation in the United States
through the use of conservation easements. Pursuant to legislation in all
states, nonprofits (NPOs) have been authorized to acquire and hold
perpetual restrictions that prevent alteration of the subject land's natural
and ecological features.' These rights can be held "in gross," with the
result that the nonprofit owning the conservation easement need not own
land near the restricted property and can be based in a distant location.
Between 2000 and 2005, land owned by (nonprofit) land trusts increased
48 percent to a total of 1.7 million acres while, during that period, land
trusts increased their conservation easement holdings to 3.7 million acres
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; Visiting Fellow, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 0 Gerald Komgold 2010. Email: gkorngold@nyls.edu; Tel: 212-
431-2154.
See discussion infra Part IA, I.B (describing the attributes of conservation easements).
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for an increase of 148 percent.2 Conservation easements in gross have
presented a lower-cost, effective, far-reaching American conservation
tool.
Based on this success, in more recent years, proponents have
advocated the export of conservation easements from the United States to
other countries, specifically calling for or reporting on the establishment
of "conservation easements" abroad.' A vehicle like a conservation
easement and having some or perhaps all of its attributes could be
employed in other countries to achieve various local and national
conservation goals. For example, conservation restrictions could be used
for watershed protection, thus preserving drinking water; habitat and
biodiversity conservation, safeguarding threatened species for psychic or
aesthetic enjoyment or perhaps for economically beneficial ecotourism or
controlled harvesting of wildlife and plants;' open space preservation,
2 ROB ALDRICH & JAMES WYERMAN, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2005 NATIONAL LAND TRUST
CENSUS REPORT 8 (2006), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/2005-
national-land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf. See infra Part IC (discussing additional data on
conservation easements).
See JOANNA COPE, THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN LATIN
AMERICA (2005), available at http://www.ibcperu.org/doc/isis/8380.pdf WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2003: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN A DYNAMIC WORLD 131, 171
(2003), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemal/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/B/2002/
09/06/000094946_02082404015854/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (discussing environmental
and conservation easements for urban and natural areas); Paraguay, USAID,
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin america caribbean/environment/country/paraguay.html
(last updated Nov.13, 2009); Global Climate Change: Country and Regional Information,
USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/environment/climate/countrynar/paraguay.html (last
updated March 11, 2009) (describing USAID's assistance in introducing "conservation
easements" to Paraguay); Spectacular Hummingbird Protected by First Conservation Easement
in Northern Peru, AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY (July 18, 2006),
http://www.abcbirds.org/newsandreports/releases/060718.html; INT'L UNION FOR
CONSERVATION OF NATURE & WORLD LAND TRUST, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS: LAND
PURCHASE AS AN INTERVENTION STRATEGY FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 15, 23 (Sept.
24-28, 2006), http://www.worldlandtrust.org/landpurchase/pdf/2006%20Symposium%
20Proceedings.pdf (suggesting that use of conservation easements helps combat corruption); see
also infra Part III.C. I (arguing that the various interests described as conservation easements do
not actually meet the definition as defined in this article).
See Anastasia Telesetsky, Graun Bilong Mipela Na Mipela No Tromweim: The Viability of
International Conservation Easements to Protect Papua New Guinea's Declining Biodiversity,
13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 735, 760 (2000-2001); Elizabeth Garland, The Elephant in the
Room: Confronting the Colonial Character of Wildlife Conservation in Africa, AFR. STUD. REV.,
Dec. 2008, at 51, 62 (describing efforts of rural African communities "to assert their right to
exploit wildlife through community-based conservation and tourism projects"); THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, CUATROCItNEGAS, MEXICO: PARKS IN PERIL END-OF-PROJECT REPORT 3
(2007), http://www.parksinperil.org/files/cuatro2b.pdf (describing need for habitat, biodiversity,
and species protection in Mexican state of Coahuila); WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 163-64
(giving various examples of threats to habitats and biodiversity across the world); see also Ralph
Blumenthal, Texas Proceeding With Plan to Auction Nature Preserve, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
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providing views and needed breaks in a developed or developing
landscape; soil conservation, preventing loss of key farmland through
deforestation, certain farming practices, and other activities;' or carbon
sequestration, to meet national or global goals and perhaps for
compensation from other countries or actors.6 Conservation restrictions
may also be used to address cross border concerns, such as preserving
habitat in various countries along the path of migrating birds.' Moreover,
the preservation of habitat and views may serve cultural, heritage, and
intergenerational imperatives within a given country.
My thesis, however, is that while conservation easements could
be a useful tool for preservation of land outside of the United States, they
may not be the most effective or suitable framework to advance
conservation restrictions in all countries. Rather than pushing for
adoption of an American-style "conservation easement" elsewhere, other
countries and American (and global) advocates of conservation devices
should engage in a process to determine a given country's appropriate
conservation toolbox. That process should be free of American legal and
conservation jargon and without a predisposition for American legal
structures, values, and policy choices. The U.S. conservation easement is
useful, however, as a model to examine many of the policy and legal
issues that arise whenever adopting private, perpetual, nonpossessory
conservation restrictions on land of another. But each country must
determine on its own whether or not private conservation restrictions
meet their economic, social, and political realities and aspirations (many
of which are quite different than the American experience reflected in
American conservation easements) and what attributes the device should
have on key issues such as duration, in gross enforcement, role of
government, etc. These national and local goals can then be given life by
finding an appropriate legal structure, ideally consistent with the
country's own jurisprudence and system.
2007, at A12 (discussing a conservation easement permitting hunting "to maintain a sustainable
population of healthy native species").
s See Robert Mitchell, Property Rights and Environmentally Sound Management of Farmland and
Forests, in LAND LAW REFORM: ACHIEVING DEVELOPMENT POLICY OBJECTIVES 175, 176 (John
W. Bruce et al. eds., 2006) (explaining need for soil conservation).
6 See Susan Subak, Forest Protection and Reforestation in Costa Rica: Evaluation of a Clean
Development Mechanism Prototype, 26 ENVTL. MGMT. 283, 283 (2000) (describing carbon
offset purchases in Costa Rica).
See AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY, supra note 3; Land Protection Programs, DUCKS
UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org/conservation/land-protection (last visited May 19, 2011).
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This article will provide an analytical framework for the major
policy and legal issues that could, and in my view should, inform a
nation's decision to adopt private conservation restrictions. These
include cost, efficiency, preference for private versus governmental
actors, the benefits and costs of perpetual limits on land, and public land
use regulation as an alternative. Moreover, specific issues related to other
countries are examined: the tradeoff between development and
conservation, the specter of neocolonialism in exporting conservation
methods and values, the mission and capacity of the NPO sector, and the
legal system. I argue that adopting an American off-the-shelf
"conservation easement" model that is inconsistent with a country's
needs and culture will make it less likely that the conservation goals will
actually be achieved and become more real than words on paper. Finally,
I demonstrate that the learning about conservation restrictions should be
a two-way street, not just the export of American methods: the views of
some other countries about governmental involvement in private
conservation may teach valuable lessons to American jurisdictions about
the need for an increased role of government and the public in certain
aspects of the selection, modification, and termination of some
conservation easements.
I make two disclaimers up front. First, this article and my other
writings support the use of private conservation easements in the United
States; my critique and suggested changes in U.S. law are intended to
make these interests more effective for current and future generations.
Second, I do not pretend to have expertise in the law of the over two-
hundred countries that might consider adoption of private conservation
restrictions. Rather, this article seeks to raise the questions that countries
might, and in my view should, consider when deciding whether to take
such a path. In exploring the issues, I refer to the law of some specific
countries for illustrative purposes.
Part I discusses conservation easements in the United States and
their attributes, legal validity, and proliferation. Then, Part II critically
examines the policy framework inherent in conservation easements and
alternative private land restrictions that other nations may contemplate.
This Part explores efficiency benefits, cost issues, the advantages and
disadvantages in nonprofit as opposed to governmental ownership, the
blessings and burdens of perpetuity, and the alternative of conservation
regulation as opposed to acquisition of a property interest. Part III
8 See source cited infra note 11.
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assesses additional considerations for other countries in considering
private conservation restrictions: whether their NPO sectors are willing
and able to take on acquisition and stewardship of conservation interests,
concerns about colonialism in adopting the policy and legal structure of
conservation easements in lieu of development, and civil law and other
domestic legal roadblocks to instituting conservation easements. Part IV
critiques and compares, in light of the policy considerations that the
article develops, some alternatives to U.S.-style conservation easements
(such as payments for environmental services, usufruct, leases, etc.) that
other countries could employ to impose private conservation restraints.
Finally, Part V discusses the experience of non-U.S. common law
nations in adopting conservation easements, and how differences and
similarities to the U.S. form reflect those countries' policy choices.
I. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Conservation easements have emerged in the United States over
the past thirty years as an essential vehicle for private efforts in the
preservation of ecological and environmental features of land.' This
section will discuss the key attributes of private conservation easements
in the American experience, the legal issues involved in their validation,
and the (limited) data on the number of such restrictions.
A. ATTRIBUTES
A definition of a private conservation in gross is essential to
understand these interests as well as the variables that can be adjusted
when creating alternate conservation restrictions. The features of private
conservation easements in gross are:
* a private interest, i.e., held by a nonprofit organization rather
than a governmental entityo
9 See infra Part .A, I.C.
10 For examples of governmental conservation easements see, e.g., Harris v. United States, 19 F.3d
1090, 1092 (5th Cit. 1994) (discussing federal Farmers Home Administration placing
conservation easements on property at urging of Fish and Wildlife Service); Mira Mar Mobile
Cmty. v. City of Oceanside, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 318-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that city
required conservation easements to mitigate impact of proposed building project); Conservation
Law Found., Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 786 A.2d 616, 618-20 (Me. 2001) (stating that the
town's conditioning subdivision plans on developer granting conservation easement was
permitted); see also Frederick W. Cubbage & David H. Newman, Forest Policy Reformed: A
United States Perspective, 9 FOREST POL'Y & ECON. 261, 270 (2005) (noting that there is
ongoing use of conservation easements by federal forest programs); Brian W. Ohm, The
Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin's Great River Road: A Progress Report on
Vol 28, No. 4 591
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* restricts the owner of the servient (i.e., burdened) land from
altering the environmental features of the property, and is
enforceable by the nonprofit organization"
* a "less-than-fee" interest (i.e., a limited, nonpossessory,
enforcement right), with the servient owner otherwise
retaining fee ownership of and rights to the landl2
* "in gross," i.e., the nonprofit owner of the easement does not
need to own land near the servient property in order to enforce
the easement and the nonprofit can be located far away from
the servient land (i.e., no appurtenancy requirement)13
* perpetual, or at least capable of perpetual ownership
* a property interest in the holder, i.e., assertable in rem
against the land itself and not merely a contractual obligation
of the servient (aka burdened) owner
* binding on successor owners of the servient property
* assignable as a property right to other nonprofits or
governmental entities
* created voluntarily by the parties, not by governmental
compulsion
The conservation easement developed in the United States as a
response in part to an increased environmental consciousness of the
citizenry in light of urban, suburban, and commercial expansion
threatening pristine sites, as well as a desire for a private (i.e., non-
governmental) land interest that could promote conservation values.14
Perpetuity, 66 J. AM. PLANNING Ass'N 177, 177-78 (2000) (reporting the state of Wisconsin's
creation of conservation easements adjacent to the Mississippi River in the 1950s and 1960s).
GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS
AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 2.02 (2d ed. 2004).
12 KORNGOLD, supra note 11, § 2.01 (the terms "fee" or "fee simple absolute" refer to the
maximum ownership interest under the Anglo-American legal system, allowing for perpetual,
fully transferable, inheritable, and devisable tenure, giving full rights of possession and power to
exclude others. The use of the term "fee" herein is meant to include analogs within other legal
systems that grant maximum land ownership rights); see generally UGO MATTEI, BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 77
(2000).
13 KORNGOLD, supra note 11, § 2.03.
14 See Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of
Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 119, 125-31 (2010) (explaining that modem
conservation easement movement was part of American environmental awakening).
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The concept of "conservation easement" first appeared in the late 1950s
in the United States and has become legally and popularly accepted over
the years." Conservation easements restrict the owner of a property from
altering the environmental, ecological, natural, open, or scenic features
of the land.'" The goal is to preserve the subject land in its current
condition, free from additional development or degradation of natural
features. Easement documents often provide a general statement of
purpose to protect the property's natural attributes and then bind the
owner not to take actions that would interfere with this purpose."
Additionally, easements include clauses barring specific actions by the
owner such as subdivision of the parcel and the erection of new
15 William H. Whyte, Jr. popularized if not coined the phrase, and was an early proponent. See
WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., Securing Open Space for Urban America: Conservation Easements
(1959), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL WILLIAM H. WHYTE 141, 143 (Albert LaFarge ed., 2000).
Early influential legal writers and supporters of conservation easements included Russell
Brenneman. See RUSSELL BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN
LAND 20 (1967); Roger Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautification Program,
45 DENv. L.J. 167, 168 (1968). See RICHARD BREWER, CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (2003), for a history of the land trust movement and its work on
conservation easements. For prior work on the conservation easements, see Gerald Korngold,
Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of In Gross Real
Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. REV. 433 (1984) for prior work on the conservation
easements [hereinafter Conservation Servitudes]; Gerald Komgold, Solving the Contentious
Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting Flexibility for the Future and Engaging
the Public Land Use Process, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 1039 (2007) [hereinafter Contentious Issues].
For other articles on conservation easements, see James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics of
Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVT'L
L.J. 209 (2000); Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts
and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1077 (1996); Jessica Owley Lippmann, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84
NEB. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of
Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENvT'L. L. REV. 421 (2005); Peter M. Morrisette,
Conservation Easements and the Public Good: Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41
NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of
Court Opinions on the Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other
Conservation and Preservation Tools: Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV.
373 (2001); Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private Conservation
Easements Over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2010); Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Condemning Conservation Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in
Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1897 (2008); Julia D. Mahoney, Land Preservation and
Institutional Design, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 433, 433 (2008); James L. Olmstead, Representing
Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem ofNow, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 451, 458-59 (2008).
1 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 174 (1981).
17 See, e.g., Glass v. Comm'r, 471 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2006).
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buildings," interference with the soil and drainage,' 9 removal of timber,
the building of roads, storage of trash, and use of certain vehicles.20
Conservation easements typically do not grant public access to
the burdened property.2 1 Rather, the public benefit of conservation
easements is habitat protection and "visual access," rather than physical
access, over open space.22 Only in rare cases is the public granted access
for recreational use.23
B. LEGAL VALIDITY
The path to legal validation of conservation easements was not
easy. Under the common law, there were several legal impediments in
various American states. First, a "conservation easement" is not a true
easement. Typically, easements grant affirmative rights, such as a right
of way over the land of another.24 The conservation interest creates a
restriction on the use of the subject property and, thus, is a covenant.25
Because of a historic suspicion of the common law toward negative
restrictions on land,26 with courts stating that covenants are not "favorites
of the law," 27 there was a risk that some courts might have been biased
against enforcement of conservation interests. In contrast, easements
have long been respected and routinely enforced by the courts, so that
choice of the term "conservation easement" by its proponents probably
represented an attempt to bootstrap common law acceptance for these
interests.28
8 Id; cf McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102, 104 (1991).
'9 See, e.g., Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
20 See ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH: CONSERVATION EASEMENT
DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 61-67 (2004).
21 See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(3)(iii) (2010) (no public access required); BRENNEMAN, supra
note 15, at 100.
22 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(B).
23 ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 66 ("The overwhelming majority of easements grant no
rights to the public to enter the property."); Boyd et al., supra note 15, at 222; ELIZABETH BYERS
& KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK 21 (2d ed. 2005); see
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(2)(ii).
24 KORNGOLD, supra note 11.
25 Id. at 19,287-88.
2 Id. at 298-99.
27 See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Conn. Packing Co., 732 F.2d 286, 289 (2d Cir. 1984);
Lacer v. Navajo Cnty., 687 P.2d 404, 411 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Harbour v. Northwest Land
Co., 681 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Ark. 1984).
28 Under modem conceptions, covenants are viewed as valuable property interests. The
Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes (2000) advocates merger of easements and
covenants into a single interest known as a "servitude," to be fully recognized and enforced by
the courts as per the parties' intent. See Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement
594
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Second, U.S. jurisdictions are split on the enforceability of in
gross interests against successor owners of the burdened land. The
traditional rule has been that burdens cannot run when the benefit is in
gross.2 9 A closer reading of these cases, however, might arguably allow
in gross conservation interests.30 Moreover, the minority American
view,' now endorsed as the recommended view by the third Restatement
of Property-Servitudes,32 permits in gross enforcement of covenants.
Indeed, at least one U.S. court has upheld a conservation easement based
on common law principles where the enabling statute did not apply.33
Still, the important in gross feature sought by nonprofits in
conservation easements is, at a minimum, in doubt under the common
law of many states. The uncertainty factor would dissuade responsible
nonprofits from expending capital, time, and expenses to acquire dubious
conservation interests.
Finally, the perpetual nature of private conservation easements-
viewed by their proponents as essential to the goal of preservation of
land for future generations34 and required by the Internal Revenue Code
for income tax deductibility"-raises some potential red flags under the
common law of covenants. Where parties fail to specify the duration for
a conservation easement, courts suspicious of restraints on land36 may
apply a minority view that imposes a "reasonable," not perpetual,
duration on the covenant." Even if a perpetual duration is specified,
courts may use tools of interpretation and enforcement to limit the reach
of a conservation restriction."
(Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 225, 227 (2000). Courts are not
bound by the Restatement, however, and old rules and inclinations are likely to continue for
some time. See, e.g., AKG Real Estate, LLC v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835, 842 (Wis. 2006)
(specifically rejecting Third Restatement rule on modification or termination of easements).
29 See KORNGOLD, supra note 11, at 381 (citing cases).
30 See Conservation Servitudes, supra note 15, at 470-79 (arguing that while the cases may not
support enforcement of all conservation easements they may indicate enforcement of certain
ones), particularly id. at 475-76 (discussing Inhabitants of Middlefield v. Church Mills Knitting
Co., 35 N.E. 780 (Mass.1894)).
31 See KORNGOLD, supra note 11, § 9.15, 383-88; see, e.g., Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v.
Richmond, 440 N.E.2d 1264 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), affd, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1983).
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.6, cmt. d (2000).
3 See Bennett v. Comm'r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1991) (involving a
governmental, not private, conservation easement).
34 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 153 (form document providing for perpetuity).
s I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2011).
36 See KORNGOLD, supra note 11, § 2.02.
37 Id at 436-37 (citing cases).
31 Id. at 402-03.
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Therefore, private conservation easements might be legal and
enforceable in some U.S. states under the common law but questionable
or impermissible in many other states. As indicated above, the
uncertainty is a great disincentive for transactions. Clarity was required
to allow the conservation easement to become a powerful environmental
protection tool.
As a result, proponents sought and obtained in all U.S. states
legislation that recognizes and permits conservation easements (perhaps
under different names such as conservation restrictions)." The Uniform
Conservation Easement Act (the "Act") was first promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1981,
and twenty-two states have adopted legislation following this model.40
The Act specifically addresses questions raised by the common law,
erasing doubt, ratifying viability, or reversing rules so that conservation
easements are a fully valid interest within the jurisdiction. The Act
specifically allows conservation easements to be held by NPOs4 1 and
allows for them to be assigned to other NPOs or governmental entities.42
Conservation easements are valid even though they are in gross43 and
negative restrictions." The Act states that conservation easements are
legitimate, nonpossessory property interests45 and are treated as all other
easements in terms of creation, enforceability, and administration.46
Conservation easements are presumed to be perpetual unless limited by
the instrument creating them.47 Finally, the preface to the Act recognizes
conservation easements as part of the U.S. belief in "private ordering of
property relationships as sound public policy."48
Courts have applied conservation easement statutes to uphold the
validity of privately held conservation restrictions. These decisions, for
example, have barred fee owners from introducing commercial
recreational activities that would interfere with the property's natural
conditions49 and found that the fee owners' re-grading of their land
3 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (LexisNexis 2010).
40 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 163 (1981).
41 UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2)(ii) (1981).
42 Id. § 4(2).
43 Id. § 4(1).
4 Id. § 4(4).
" Id. §I (1).
46 Id. § 2(a).
47 Id. § 2(c).
48 Id. at 3 (see Commissioners' Prefatory Note for discussion).
49 Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (easement holder was local land trust).
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violated a conservation easement requiring them to maintain the land in
its natural condition.so
C. DATA
There is only limited data on the number of conservation
easements in the United States and the amount of acres under restriction.
The available numbers, however, indicate significant growth in the
number of American conservation easements. The Land Trust Alliance,
the national professional association of land trusts, reported that in 2005,
local and state land trusts held conservation easements on over 6.2
million acres, a 148 percent increase from the 2000 figure of 2.5 million
acres." Additionally, The Nature Conservancy reports that it holds 3.2
million acres under conservation easements.52 Other nonprofit
organizations also hold conservation easements in addition to these two
major players.
In at least some states, the percentage of land under private
conservation easements is not insignificant. For example, 6.58 percent of
the total land in Maine and 6.49 percent in Vermont is subject to
conservation easements held by land trusts only (i.e., this figure does not
reflect easements owned by other entities).5 4
5o Nature Conservancy, Inc. v. Sims, No. 07-112-JMH, 2009 WL 602031 at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5,
2009) (easement held by The Nature Conservancy, Inc.).
51 ALDRICH & WYERMAN, supra note 2, at 5. A public-private partnership involving key players in
conservation easements has launched a project to create a database of U.S. conservation
easements. NAT'L CONSERVATION EASEMENT DATABASE, http://www.conservationeasement.us/
(last visited May 20, 2011). The data will be developed from self-reporting by land trusts and
agencies. Id. However, there is no discussion of independent searching of recorders' offices
across the country to create a complete database (which would be a difficult and expensive
endeavor). Thus, at best, the database project, even if completed, will not give a full picture of
private conservation holdings in the U.S.
52 Fast Facts about Conservation Easements, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY (March 2, 2011),
http://www.nature.org/aboutus/privatelandsconservation/conservationeasements/fast-facts-about-
conservation-easements.xml; see Joseph M. Kiesecker et al., Conservation Easements in
Context: A Quantitative Analysis of Their Use by The Nature Conservancy, 5 FRONTIERS IN
ECOLOGY & ENv'T. 125 (2007).
5 See e.g., Conservation Easement Program, DUCKS UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org/
conservation/land-protection/conservation-easement-program (last visited May 20, 2011)
(example of an active conservation easement program to protect habitat).
5 These figures are calculated by taking the numbers of acres under easement held by land trusts
according to the NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT, supra note 2, and dividing this
number by the total acres in the state according to the U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND
METROPOLITAN DATA BOOK, Table E-1, 2006, available at http://www.census.gov/
compendia/smadb/TableE-01.pdf (using a factor of 640 acres per square mile; thus, Maine's
conservation easement acreage of 1,492,279 is 6.58% of 22,646,400 and Vermont's conservation
easement acreage of 399,861 is 6.49% of 6,152,960).
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II. A POLICY CALCULUS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
AND ALTERNATIVES
Private, perpetual conservation easements in gross bring
substantial benefits but also raise policy questions. These issues have
marked the American experience with these interests, and other countries
contemplating the adoption of a U.S. model of easements must closely
consider them. Moreover, this policy calculus is also relevant to
alternative private conservation vehicles that other nations may adopt,
such as payments for environmental services, real rights under civil law,
and others."
This Part will develop and apply a policy framework for
analyzing private conservation easements in gross and alternatives to
achieve preservation of open space and natural habitat. It will consider
conservation easements and the following other vehicles: (1) fee
ownership to achieve conservation purposes, (2) governmental, rather
than nonprofit, ownership, (3) limited, non-perpetual land rights, and (4)
governmental regulation, instead of a property-based regime, to
accomplish conservation goals. I conclude that private conservation
easements in gross have great advantages in the United States and
deserve continued validation and enforcement, albeit with a few changes
to achieve greater public input and protection of future generations.
Other nations will have to work within the policy framework developed
below to determine their own course of action.
A. EFFICIENCY: FEE OWNERSHIP VS. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Land could be conserved by acquiring full possessory title (i.e.,
fee ownership in the United States) rather than a conservation easement.
Easements are generally a lower-cost alternative to fees for both
nonprofits and the public.
1. CONSERVATION COSTS
Acquisition and stewardship costs for fees are higher than for
easements, thus reducing the total amount of land that can be preserved
through the fee route.56 First, acquiring fee title is more expensive as a
fee purchaser must pay for the full value of the land while an easement
5 See discussion of alternatives infra Part IV.
56 Robert E. Coughlin & Thomas Plaut, Less-Than-Fee Acquisition for the Preservation of Open
Space: Does It Work?, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 452 (1978); see also Paul R. Armsworth &
James N. Sanchirico, The Effectiveness of Buying Easements as a Conservation Strategy, I
CONSERVATION LETTERS 182 (2008).
598
Globalizing Conservation Easements
buyer only has to compensate for the loss of the unused development
rights of the property, which the owner may not have intended to exploit
in any case." Moreover, many landowners choose to donate conservation
easements rather than to sell them for consideration since § 170(h) of the
Internal Revenue Code permits a federal income tax deduction for
restrictions for conservation purpose given to a qualified nonprofit."
Thus, there may be no easement acquisition costs at all for the NPO in
the United States, with the cost subsidized by the public through the tax
deduction." Finally, since conservation easements have been authorized
by law in all states,"o transaction costs for engaging in and enforcing such
arrangements have been greatly reduced. One might expect that the
acquisition cost of a less than full interest in property in other countries
would also be cheaper than a fee. Uncertainty as to land titles in general,
enforceability of conservation rights, and overall rule of law concerns,
however, may effectively prevent such conservation transactions or make
transaction costs extremely high in other countries."
Holders of conservation interests face stewardship and perhaps
maintenance responsibilities. An entity that purchases a fee for
conservation purposes, like other owners, must expend funds to generally
maintain the property, engage in risk management, and inspect it to
ensure that trespassers or visitors are not interfering with its conservation
values. An easement owner, in contrast, is not responsible for the general
expenses. For the conservation easement to be effective and achieve its
purpose, though, the easement holder must regularly inspect and monitor
the burdened property to ensure that the terms of the restriction are not
being violated (for example, impermissible building, tree cutting,
commercial activities, etc.).62 This is especially challenging not only
because of the cost but also because the burdened owner is on the
s7 See Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing Land: Open Space and Conservation Easements,
STATE TAX NOTES, Sept. 11, 2006, at 749-51, available at http://www.landprotect.com/files/
39299417.pdf. For example, beautiful natural features may increase the value of a home on the
property that may help offset the loss of the ability to develop the property further.
s I.R.C. 170(h)(l)(B)-(C), 170(h)(2)(C) (2010); see C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of
Conservation Easements, 5 Wyo. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (2005); Stephen J. Small, Real Estate
Developers and Conservation Easements-Not As Simple As It Sounds, 19 PROB. & PROP.
May/June 2005, at 24.
5 See the policy aspects of this deduction discussed infra Part II.B.1.
6o See supra Part I.B.
61 See infra Part II.D. 1.
62 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 142-43.
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property with virtually unlimited opportunities to violate the covenant."
To address the cost concern, some nonprofits require that donors of
conservation easements also provide stewardship funds.' Still, the
maintenance and stewardship costs are less for easements than fees.
2. THE PUBLIC
Utilizing easements serves the goal of enhancing efficient use of
our world's limited land resources. A conservation easement owner can
accomplish its land preservation goal; at the same time, the owner of the
burdened land can make productive use of the property consistent with
the terms of the easement (perhaps as a residence, for farming, etc.) and
to receive compensation for the lost right. The easement purchaser only
pays the amount of consideration necessary to acquire the right that it
needs and wants. If a fee were used, however, the fee purchaser would be
forced to "overinvest" in conservation by paying for full possessory right
to the property when a lesser restriction would have accomplished its
goal. More expensive fee purchases would mean that NPOs would be
able to conserve less land with their funds. At the same time, purchasing
a property in fee for conservation takes it fully out of the market.
Financial incentives for conservation raise some concerns.
Programs of NPO purchase of conservation easements or fees (or
accepting donations with accompanying tax deductions) may lead to
strategic behavior by landowners. For example, owners may attempt to
"extort" direct or indirect payments by threatening to destroy
environmental features on their land."5 The conservation environmental
purchaser must also avoid overpaying when the landowner has no current
plans to develop, since the owner has no current opportunity costs and is
only selling the future option value of the land. 6 Finally, payments for
63 For discussion of the difficulties faced in enforcing conservation easements, see JEFF PIDOT,
REINVENTING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM
18-19 (2005) available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1051_Reinventing-Conservation-
Easements.
6 See ANELLA & WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 28; BYERS & PONTE, supra note 23, at 126.
65 See SVEN WUNDER, NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICE PAYMENTS 4 (Jan. 31-
Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/08_Tropics Conference/
Tropics Conference Papers/Tropics ConferenceWunderPES markets.pdf; Paul J. Ferraro,
Global Habitat Protection: Limits of Development Interventions and a Role for Conservation
Performance Payments, 15 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 990, 997 (2001).
66 One way for a nonprofit with limited funds to purchase easements and a number of potential
easements to acquire would be to conduct an auction among the landowners of the available
conservation dollars. Paul Ferraro, Asymmetric Information and Contract Design for Payments
for Environmental Services, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 810, 819 (2008).
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conservation easements may also undermine a conservation ethic already
observed by the landowner based on non-monetary values."7 But these
are issues with both fee and easement purchases.
3. RECOMMENDATION
The use of a less than fee interest for conservation protection has
tremendous advantages and few, if any, disadvantages. These interests
promote an efficient use of the world's limited land resources while
providing a vehicle to achieve ecological protection. In the United States,
the conservation easement has been an effective and legally valid
vehicle. Other countries, however, can develop a conservation restriction
with similar attributes within their own legal systems.
B. NONPROFIT VS. GOVERNMENTAL OWNERSHIP
1. COSTS
Nonprofit ownership of conservation easements means that
government does not have to bear direct expenses to acquire and steward
conservation easements." In an era of tight governmental budgets and
cuts, private resources may be essential (if not the only way) to sustain
open space and habitat conservation. 69 There are, however, significant tax
subsidies to private conservation easements that, in effect, transfer
acquisition costs to the federal, state, and local government.
The federal income tax deduction for contributions of qualifying
conservation easements under IRC § 170(h)70 yielded a tax expenditure
by the U.S. Treasury for 2007 of approximately $700 million." There are
additional Treasury losses as conservation easements lower the value of
property subject to federal estate taxes.72 There are also state and local
tax subsidies. The imposition of a conservation easement reduces the
property's assessment for state and local ad valorem (property) tax
67 wUNDER, supra note 65, at 4.
68 See BYERS & PONTE, supra note 23, at 9-10.
69 See Brett Zongker, Grants That Saved Historic Relics Now Endangered, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 7, 2010, available on Westlaw at 3/7/10 APDATASTREAM 19:26:05 (reporting on
proposed federal budget cuts in fund preserving American historical artifacts).
70 See generally supra Part I.B.
7 In 2007, almost $2 billion in deductions were taken in conservation easements. Pearson Liddell
& Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2007, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN,
Spring 2010, Figure B at 54, http://www.irs.gov/publirs-soi/lOsprbulindcontO7.pdf This would
mean a public revenue loss of approximately $700 million (as donors are in high brackets).
72 26 C.F.R. § 25.2703-1(a)(4) (2010).
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purposes because of its limited potential use." This forces the local
government to cut back services because of diminished revenue or to
increase the tax rate on other citizens.74 Moreover, some states give state
income tax deductions or credits for conservation easement donations."
These government subsidies are additional expenditures that must be
calculated in the true cost of private conservation easements. Other
countries adopting similar tax subsidies must consider these costs."
2. THE ETHOS OF PRIVATE ACTION
Part of lore and reality is that Americans tend to rely more on
individual and private sector solutions to communal problems and less on
governmental intervention than other countries do." For many
Americans, this belief manifests itself in a normative preference that
private rather than governmental holding of land increases social
welfare." Americans generally value the personal freedom of allowing
owners to do what they want with their property-subject to others'
rights and the rare imposition by the law on owners' rights for overriding
reasons-and to thereby achieve personal satisfaction."
73 See, e.g., Jet Black, L.L.C. v. Rout Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 165 P.3d 744, 750-51 (Colo.
App. 2006); Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S. 2d, 541, 544-45 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); see also
Daniel C. Stockford, Comment, Property Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 823 (1990).
74 A fee purchase by government or a nonprofit organization will take the property entirely off the
tax rolls for the purposes of state and local ad valorem property taxation as government and
nonprofits are exempt from tax.
7 For credits, see, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (2010); N.C. GENSTAT. § 105-151.12 (2010).
Deductions are usually reflected not by a specific state tax code provision but by the state
tracking the federal income tax structure and its deductions. See also Jeffrey 0. Sundberg &
Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects of Conservation Easements, nn.15-16 &
accompanying text (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WPO6JS1, 2006),
available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1 128 Tax-and-Property-Value-Effects-of-
Conservation-Easements.
76 See, e.g., Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 31.5 (Austl.) (providing for a deduction for a
perpetual conservation covenant that decreases the market value of the property, subject to other
conditions); Land Tax Assessment Act of 2002 (WA) s 41 (Austl.) (providing for a land tax
exemption for any year where land is used solely or principally for the conservation of native
vegetation).
7 Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in
THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 89, 90 (Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M.
Salamon eds., 2d ed. 2006).
78 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 33 (6th ed. 2002); see also RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985) ("[Tlhe
end of the state is to protect liberty and property").
7 See Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1968) ("Where a man's land is concerned, he may
impose ... any restrictions he pleases"); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (2d ed. 1998); see also John
Vol. 28, No. 4 Globalizing Conservation Easements
This American belief in private action and personal freedom,
especially with respect to land arrangements, directly supports the
adoption and use of private conservation easements in gross-it is a
comfortable fit."o Moreover, there is a belief that a conservation easement
held by an NPO will be more secure and permanent since NPOs, unlike
government officials, are not subject to the political and financial
pressures of pro-development forces demanding the watering down of an
easement."
For other countries, however, private ownership and
administration of conservation rights may not fit with cultural, social,
and political values. Other nations may prefer reliance on government
action for provision of environmental protection.82 This is in addition to
questions about the capacity of the nonprofit sector, a matter discussed
later.
3. CLASS ISSUES
Despite the benefits of nonprofit action in the American context,
there is a risk of elitism in the decisionmaking and composition of the
nonprofit boards controlling conservation easements. Conservation
easements can in effect achieve "private large lot zoning" and prevent
the building of affordable housing or environmentally friendly planned
unit developments." Thus, conservation easements may result in an
increase of neighborhood exclusivity, the barring of newcomers, and the
frustration of new ideas in residential communities.
William H. Whyte, the early promoter of conservation
easements, cautioned against the "muted class and economic conflicts"
Stith, A View for the Ages, POST STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Nov. 30, 2009 at A4 (describing
growth of local land trust).
8o See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1353, 1359 (1982); UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 41, at 2 (see
Commissioners' Prefatory Note that states "There are both practical and philosophical reasons
for not subjecting conservation easements to a public ordering system.... If it is the intention to
facilitate private grants that serve the ends of land conservation and historic preservation,
moreover, the requirement of public agency approval adds a layer of complexity which may
discourage private actions.").
8' See generally James M. Buchanan, Constraints on Political Action, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND
PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 107 (James M. Buchanan &
Richard Musgrave eds., 1999) (reviewing public choice theory and pressures on politicians).
82 See discussion comparing nonprofit sectors infra Part III.A.
83 See Miriam Jordan, In Tony Monterey County, Slums and a Land War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26,
2006, at Al (dispute between environmentalists seeking to preserve scenery and supporters of
development of lower income housing for immigrant workers).
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inherent in conservation easements.84 He posited that the "gentry" would
be the donors of conservation easements and would have an interest in
natural areas in the countryside rather than open space for parks and
playgrounds that middle-income citizens would prefer. Thus, there is a
danger that nonprofit organizations seeking conservation easements may
represent and adopt the "gentrified" viewpoint, a position that does not
encompass the broader population. Yet, under a regime of private
conservation easements, the nonprofit board is invested with significant
power over communal land decisions affecting the entire citizenry. In
contrast, if government owned such conservation easements, all voters
could express their views through a democratic process on choices
relating to conservation easement acquisition and administration.
4. CREATION OF EASEMENTS
By not requiring governmental action in the creation of
conservation easements and by permitting NPOs as holders," the U.S.
model allows for NPOs to react nimbly to conservation needs and the
market. This process is likely to be more efficient, allowing the
preservation of land that might slip through the bureaucratic cracks of a
governmental program. Nonprofits can respond quickly to a threatened
development of a property with high ecological value and get an
easement deal in place.
There is a cost, however, to independent private action by
nonprofits. Private groups have virtually unlimited discretion in
purchasing or accepting donations of easements and are not bound to
follow standards or a general conservation plan in these decisions."
NPOs may accept any conservation easement that appears on its
doorstep, even though it is of doubtful environmental benefit.
84 WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN 36: SECURING OPEN
SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 37 (1959).
85 Massachusetts is the only U.S. state requiring government approval (local and state) before a
conservation easement may be created. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (LexisNexis 2010).
86 The Uniform Conservation Easement Act only states values inherent in conservation easements
and does not provide standards. UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, supra note 41, § 1(1).
IRC § 170(h) (2010) provides only minimal requirements for deductibility, not an optimal level.
For example, to qualify for an open space deduction the easement must only provide "scenic
enjoyment" with a "significant public benefit." 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2010).
The factors to define these terms set out in the Regulations are vague and highly elastic, giving
wide latitude. See Contentious Issues, supra note 15, at 1067-70 (dealing with these tax
standards). "Best practices" followed by many land trusts and provided by the Land Trust




Governmental officials are accountable to the citizens for their
conservation easement decisions through the election and recall
processes. Nonprofits and individual actors lack this public
accountability.
Furthermore, the various NPOs do not acquire or accept
easements pursuant to a public land use and conservation plan. As a
result, the sum of conservation easements in an area may be less than its
parts-there could be a patchwork of easements that do not equal an
effective community-wide conservation plan." Thus, the decisions and
missions of non-accountable individuals and nonprofits, rather than
community preferences, could drive open space and habitat preservation
acquisition and management in a given area. In comparison, in the arena
of public land use controls the modem trend is away from localized
planning to county, statewide, and regional approaches to environmental
issues." Especially with the significant tax subsidies for the creation and
continuation of conservation easements in the U.S. context," it is fair to
question whether an uncoordinated private system maximizes the
public's interest.
5. IN GROSS OWNERSHIP
In gross ownership of conservation easements has the benefit of
allowing nonprofits to engage in far-reaching conservation efforts and
freeing them from the expense and difficulty of acquiring neighboring
land to anchor a conservation easement. In gross ownership, however,
exacerbates the concern over private control, as it allows a distant
nonprofit to own easements that affect the local community." Thus, local
land use decisions and choices can be controlled by an entity that has
little or no stake in the economic and social issues facing a community.
* See Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the Number of Land Trusts
Make Economic Sense?, 79 LAND ECON. 311, 312 (2003) ("local land trusts specializing in
providing open space often do not consider the impact of their decisions on regional conservation
benefits"; "lack of coordination" among land trusts "has become ... a serious problem.").
88 See ANTHONY DOWNs, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 26-30, 132-34 (1994);
Robert Fishman, The Death and Life of American Regional Planning, in REFLECTIONS ON
REGIONALISM 107-23 (Bruce Katz ed., 2000).
89 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing initial deductions for donations and ongoing property tax
savings).
9 See supra Part I.A (defining in gross ownership).
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6. LESSONS LEARNED FOR ALL COUNTRIES
NPO ownership of conservation easements presents great
opportunities but also some risks. I have suggested in earlier work that I
believe that the risks in the creation of conservation easements have been
understated and that some adjustments in the U.S. model would make
these interests even more effective. Primarily, I have urged that the
federal income tax deduction for conservation easements should only be
granted if the easement is approved by local, state, or federal authorities
as being consistent with a governmental conservation plan." This will
ensure that the public financial investment through the tax subsidy is
being well spent, with the easement being a part of a valid conservation
goal. Such a process would also provide for community input through the
election of local officials who approve the conservation plans. The
requirement of approval is consistent with the treatment of historical
easements where prior governmental approval of the significance of the
building or site is needed for a deduction.92 Finally, freedom of choice of
owners is being maintained because owners may still donate
easements-the public simply will not pay for those that do not serve a
defined public interest.
Both the United States and other countries can learn from each
other's views on the governmental/private organization dichotomy. For
those nations that tend to prefer governmental provision of services, the
significant benefits of NPOs owning conservation easements may
encourage experimentation with these nongovernmental actors and
interests. U.S. jurisdictions might learn from other countries about the
value of governmental participation in the conservation easement process
and consider ways to inject governmental involvement consistent with a
private action model.
C. THE BLESSINGS AND BURDENS OF PERPETUITY
Perpetual duration is the gold standard for American
conservation easements.93 Proponents value infinite conservation
easements as they preserve the land forever, leaving the habitat and open
space benefits for future generations. In contrast, conservation easements
9' Contentious Issues, supra note 15, at 1066-70.
92 See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A) (iv) (2010); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(d)(5)(iii) (2010); see Herman v.
Comm'r, 98 T.C.M. (CCH) (2009).
9 See supra Part I.A.
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(or alternatives) with limited durations will not protect the land far into
future.
Perpetuity, though, has its disadvantages. First, the
environmental value of particular parcels and community needs change
over time. Land once thought important for habitat or open space may no
longer be necessary or viable and other environmental priorities may
emerge.94 For example, a parcel of land might be best suited to use for
production of alternative energy such as a solar panel field" or a wind
farm' even though it would violate a conservation easement preventing
changes in the natural features of the property, including the erection of
structures. Moreover, there may come a time when the public interest
would be better served by allowing a parcel of land to be shifted to a use
that would violate a conservation easement on the property. For example,
there may be a communal need for affordable housing or economic
development in a depressed area."
If a governmental entity owned a conservation easement, the
decision to modify the easement would be made in the public arena by
the voters or their elected representatives.98 With private conservation
easements in gross, however, a non-elected, non-representative
nonprofit, perhaps located in a different city, would be making this
decision. There is no opportunity for public input to the nonprofit's
9 "[W]e have over a 100-year investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that may no
longer protect the target ecosystems for which they were formed." Cornelia Dean, The
Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at Fl (statement of Healy Hamilton,
director of the California Academy of Sciences). Consider also how maintenance regimes might
need to change. For example, assume a conservation easement that bars the use of pesticides on
the property but over time the land is threatened by an invasive plant species. Non-chemical
techniques to control the invasive species fail. Can the NPO use pesticides in order to preserve
the original plant ecosystem that the donor wished?
9 See Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B I (report was
unclear as to whether the conservation interest was a fee or easement, but conflict would be the
same in either situation).
96 See Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town Ownership of Lots, SUN J. (Lewiston, Me.),
Dec. 1, 2009 (town meeting to vote on release of conservation easement to allow wind farm).
9 For a more prosaic example, see Stephen Beale, Dog Park Site Denied in Bedford Due to
Easement, UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), July 23, 2008, at BI (land trust holding
conservation easement denied use of land for dog park sought by town).
98 See, e.g., Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir. 1985); see Trent
Spiner, Hopkinton Preserves Farmland; Special Town Meeting Approves Conservation
Easement, CONCORD MONITOR (N.H.), Dec. 6, 2009 (describing New Hampshire town meeting
to determine whether town should invest in a farmland conservation easement). The
governmental decision may be subject to a judicial cypres action to determine the validity of the
proposed modification. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 cmt. (amended 2007)
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ucea/2007_final.pdf, see also
Contentious Issues, supra note 15, at 1078.
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decision and no accountability through the electoral process. The NPO's
unitary mission of conservation may not encompass the flexibility that
the community needs to implement other values.99
The danger of perpetual conservation restrictions can be
ameliorated if there are ways to modify the duration in those rare and
extraordinary cases when the public interest requires. First, the law must
be made clear that nonprofit directors are shielded from liability if they
modify a particular easement as long as they are obedient to the overall
mission of the nonprofit."oo This will make directors willing to modify or
even terminate restrictions in special circumstances. Second, the courts
can be more aggressive in applying traditional covenant modification
doctrines to conservation easements. For example, the doctrine barring
enforcement of covenants violating public policy might be employed to
deal with the affordable housing, economic development, or alternative
energy scenarios described above."' The doctrine of relative hardship,
which limits enforcement to monetary damages rather than an injunction,
could be applied by a court to limit a NPO's remedy where the public
interest is at stake and in effect force a buyout of the easement.102 Finally,
the cy pres rule could be applied to modify a conservation restriction
held by a charitable corporation when the interest of the public would be
served.' U.S. jurisdictions and other countries would be well advised to
consider adopting or strengthening these doctrines when instituting
perpetual conservation rights.
D. REGULATION INSTEAD OF A PROPERTY RIGHT
As an alternative to the acquisition of a conservation property
right by a nonprofit or government, the government could enact
99 Market solutions are not likely to work to remove undesirable easements since conservation
groups rarely sell conservation rights and may face regulatory issues if they do. See Contentious
Issues, supra note 15, at 1064-65. Eminent domain of the easement may no longer be a viable
solution to acquit the public's interest in the post-Kelo era as state legislators and state courts
have increasingly limited takings for economic development and have required blight (not likely
present in conservation land). See id. at 1081-83.
100 Id. at 1072-73; see also Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors' Duty of
Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1677, 1694 (2009).
101 For discussion of termination and modification of covenants violating public policy, see
KORNGOLD, supra note 11, at § 10.02; see also Contentious Issues, supra note 15, at 1080.
102 See Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (requiring balancing of the
equities in enforcement of conservation easement); Fox Chapel v. Walters, No. CV 07-8008-
PCT-JAT, 2007 WL 2265684, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 6, 2007) (denying temporary restraining
order as plaintiff did not show balance of hardships favoring it); Contentious Issues, supra note
15, at 1078-79.
103 See Contentious Issues, supra note 15, at 1078.
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regulations to preserve the environmental values of land. Public
regulation has various benefits. It theoretically is the culmination of a
transparent, public process where the citizenry can exert control through
their duly elected representatives. Regulation can be based on thoughtful
study and professional planning as to environmental goals and tactics.
Moreover, regulations maintain flexibility as they can be modified to
address newly arising concerns.
There are significant disadvantages to the regulation approach,
however, that make a property-based solution superior. First, with a
regulatory approach, all benefits of private initiative and action are
lost. Government wheels may move too slowly, if at all, to adequately
preserve threatened land. Furthermore, regulation may not be permanent
enough to adequately protect the environment. Government officials are
subject to short-term pressures and interest groups lobbying to remove
protective land regulations. These forces might include the need to raise
revenue to cover short-term deficits by increasing the tax base through
development, developers and owners seeking to maximize the values of
their parcels, and election fundraising. Facing these current pressures,
government officials might compromise the long-term preservation goals
of the community by repealing or modifying land protection regulation.
The presence of a land right such as a conservation easement gives a
greater sense of psychic and legal permanence than a land regulation.
Legislative bodies can repeal regulations. In contrast, sale of real
property held by cities and towns can be prohibited or subject to certain
conditions.'o
Conservation regulations impose nonconsensual limitations on
property owners, in direct contrast to conservation easements, which are
agreed to by the parties. Nonconsensual restrictions are less desirable as
they may give rise to claims by the owners for compensation under
regulatory takings theory,'O' create ill will among the community, and
lead to a flouting or subversion of the regulation by a disgruntled
owner.o' There may be some equal protection or "reverse" spot zoning
104 See supra Part I.B.
'os See 56 AM. JUR. 2D Mun. Corp. § 486 (2010) (discussing limits on property held for the public,
arguably including governmental conservation easements); 81 N.Y. JUR. 2D Parks § 143 (2010);
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(2) (2010) (barring sale of park lands).
106 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (beginning the
modem era of Supreme Court land regulatory takings cases).
107 See Charles E. Di Leva, The Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Through Legal and
Market-Based Instruments, 11 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 84, 90-91 (2002)
(describing a situation ignoring public conservation regulation in Brazil).
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claims if the legislature restricts some individual parcels more than
neighboring ones."'s
Regulation, therefore, lacks many of the benefits of private land
restrictions. Relying solely on a governmental regulatory approach may
not yield the most effective preservation model.
E. CONCLUSIONS ON POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
There are great advantages, as well as some potential costs, to
private conservation restrictions. It seems clear that private restrictions
offer an efficient and effective alternative and complement to
governmental regulatory systems. Each country can fashion a
conservation restriction device that takes into account its particular
emphases and sensitivities to issues such as duration, governmental
involvement in creation and termination, and preservation of the public
voice and process in conservation decisions. One size of conservation
restriction does not fit all; fortunately, by being creative, countries can
fashion bespoke models that suit their needs.
III. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR NON-U.S.
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
In addition to the general policy considerations involved in
private conservation easements discussed in the prior section, there are
some specific issues when countries outside of the United States consider
adopting private conservation easements in gross (or a similar alternative
based on local law). These include whether the NPO sector in the given
nation has the capacity and willingness to assume ownership and
stewardship of conservation rights, the specter of colonialism, when a
country's goal of resource use conflicts with an American legal vehicle
and conservation values, and whether the country's legal system can
accommodate an in gross private conservation restriction.
A. DIFFERENCES IN NONPROFIT SECTORS AND ACTIVITIES
The size, structure, culture, and missions of NPOs in the United
States have made them suitable, prepared, and willing to generate
conservation easement donations and acquisitions and subsequently to
108 See Palmer Trinity Private Sch., Inc. v. Vill. of Palmetto Bay, 31 So. 3d 260, 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) ("[r]everse spot zoning occurs when a zoning ordinance prevents a property owner
from utilizing his or her property in a certain way, when virtually all of the adjoining neighbors
are not subject to such a restriction. . . ." (quoting City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So.2d
1329, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997))); Andrews v. Town of Amherst, 862 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007); C/S 12th Ave., LLC v. City of New York, 815 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
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steward these interests. Differences in the culture and histories of other
countries have led to varying nonprofit structures and functions. As a
result, the American model of nonprofits holding conservation easements
may not necessarily be appropriate or effective in other settings.
1. THE AMERICAN NPO SECTOR
In the United States, NPOs are well suited to take on the
acquisition and stewardship of conservation easements. There is
particular strength in land trusts and related environmental organizations.
(a) IN GENERAL
The nonprofit sector in the United States is large, robust, and
part of the national fabric, providing health, education, welfare, arts, and
other services. "The scale of the nonprofit sector is larger in the United
States than in most other countries."" There were at least 1.4 million
nonprofits in the United States as of 2005, representing a 27.3 percent
increase from 1995.10 Total assets in 2005 were $3.4 trillion,
representing a 125.6 percent increase,"' but, of course, this does not
account for the 2008 financial and endowment meltdown. Only three
other countries have a higher percentage of employment in the nonprofit
sector than the United States."l2
(b) LAND CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS
The environmental nonprofit sector is strong in the United
States. In 2005, there were 13,399 public charities under the IRS
category of organizations addressing "environment, animals." This
represented 4.3 percent of all public charities, having $31.6 billion in
assets." 3 Care must be taken with these numbers, though, as this category
would appear to include animal protection organizations and not only
groups devoted to land conservation and the environment.
1 Lester M. Salamon, Scope and Structure: The Anatomy ofAmerica's Nonprofit Sector, in THE
NATURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 23, 34 (J. Steven Ott ed., 2001).
"o These figures include only Internal Revenue Service-registered nonprofits, AMY BLACKWOOD ET
AL., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF 2 (2008), available at http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/
kbfiles/797/Almanac2008publicCharities.pdf. There are probably an additional 175,000 religious
nonprofits, which are not required to register with the IRS. Id. at 1.
.. Id. at 2.
112 Helmut K. Anheier & Lester M. Salamon, supra note 77, at 96; see Laura Leete, Work in the
Nonprofit Sector, in THE NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 77, at 159,
160.
" BLACKWOOD ET AL., supra note I10, at 4.
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There had been a considerable history of NPO involvement in
U.S. land conservation by the time the private conservation easement
movement began to gain strength in the 1970s. Groups advocating and
lobbying for governmental land conservation, preserves, and parks have
existed for over a century. The Sierra Club was founded by the legendary
John Muir in 1892-just over one hundred years after the forming of the
American republic-and currently has 1.4 million members.114 Other
nonprofit organizations were established beginning in the nineteenth
century to acquire and hold land for conservation purposes. The first
nongovernmental land trust-the Trustees of Public Reservations-with
a mission to acquire and hold "for the benefit of the public, beautiful and
historic places in Massachusetts," was created in 1891."' Land trusts and
other land conservation organizations, such as the various Audobon
societies, were established across the country."' As of 2005, the Land
Trust Alliance reported 1,667 member land trusts."' The Nature
Conservancy, founded in 1951, but with roots extending back to an
organization established in 1915,"1 began acquiring land for conservation
purposes in 1955 and continues to be a major holder of conservation
lands and facilitator of collaborative land conservation transactions.119
2. NONPROFITS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
While NPOs have proven to be capable holders of conservation
easements in the United States, before other countries adopt private
conservation restrictions it must be determined whether their nonprofits
are willing and able to acquire and hold these interests. This necessitates
an analysis of the mission and capacity of NPOs in other countries.
(a) MISSION
The first question is whether the missions and structures of
NPOs in other nations (where they are often referred to as
"nongovernmental entities" or NGOs) might embrace the acquisition and
stewardship of conservation easements. The nature, roles, and missions
114 Welcome to the Sierra Club, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/welcome/ (last visited
May 22, 2011).
115 BREWER, supra note 15, at 13, 17.
116 Id. at 24-25; see also Erin B. Gisler, Comment, Land Trusts in the Twenty-First Century: How
Tax Abuse and Corporate Governance Threaten the Integrity of Charitable Land Preservation,
49 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1123, 1125-27 (2009).
117 ALDRICH & WYERMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
" BREWER, supra note 15, at 186-90.
"9 Id. at 192, 204-06, 210-14.
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of nonprofit organizations differ among countries, as a function of
different cultures, histories, and values.120 For example, the U.S. form of
voluntarism and nonprofit organizations grew out of a compromise
between American values of individualism and collective
responsibility.'21
The NPO sectors of other countries vary from the U.S. model
according to factors such as a higher degree of state-provided social,
cultural, educational, and health services; religious influences; varying
amounts of civil liberties; less adherence to a capitalist model; increased
communitarian focus; tribal traditions; and other factors.'22 Differing
values in various countries also explain a related phenomenon-the
degree of involvement in voluntary associations.'2 3 Anheier and Salaman
suggest that the particular current structure of the NPO sector reflects a
country's history.'24 They identify four different NPO national models:
liberal (low government social welfare spending, with a large nonprofit
sector), social democratic (extensive state sponsored and delivered social
welfare, with limited nonprofit sector), corporatist (sizeable government
social welfare spending, with a sizeable nonprofit sector), and statist
(limited public social welfare, with limited nonprofit development).'25
The authors cite examples of nations arguably following the models:
liberal-the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia; social
democratic-Sweden, Norway, Finland, Italy; corporatist-Gennany,
Belgium, the Netherlands, France; statist-Japan, Brazil, and "much of
the developing world."' 26 In countries following models with limited
nonprofit development and activity, there may not be adequate
organizations with sufficiently broad missions to acquire and steward
conservation easements. Moreover, there may be a preference in
particular societies for government, rather than private associations, to
assume environmental activities. For example, early on, France
centralized historic preservation planning under a government agency,
120 Anheier & Salamon, supra note 77, at 89-91.
121 Id. at 90.
122 Id. at 90-91.
123 Evan Schofer & Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas, The Structural Contexts of Civic Engagement:
Voluntary Association Membership in Comparative Perspective, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 806, 806
(2001).
124 Anheier & Salanon, supra note 77, at 105-06.
125 Id. at 106-107; see Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas, supra note 123, at 811-15.
26 Anheier & Salamon, supra note 77, at 107-08.
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the Commission des Monuments Historiques, while in England
nongovernmental groups dealt with such activities.'
(b) CAPACITY
There is also the issue of capacity-are there enough NGOs and
resources in other countries to take on a role with conservation
restrictions even if this activity fits within their missions? Data on the
size of the non-U.S. NGO sector is limited. Available indicators show a
smaller sector when compared to the United States. For example, the
average percentage of the nonprofit workforce in the economically active
population of thirty-five nations (including advanced industrial,
transitional, and developing countries worldwide) is 4.4 percent.'28 The
number for the United States, in contrast, is 9.8 percent.'29 In addition to
the relatively smaller size of the NPO sector in other countries compared
to the United States, the nonprofit sector is relatively larger in the
developed countries outside of the United States as compared to the less
developed and transitioning countries. 3 0 Unless there is external
assistance, this might mean that land conservation efforts, as well as
other NGO activities, are less likely to be provided in those countries that
arguably have the greatest need and opportunity for habitat preservation.
While there are indications that the size of the NPO sector
outside the United States is growing,"' the current capacity of the
nonprofit sphere in a given country may be insufficient to take on a
conservation easements program. For example, as of 2005 there were
only seven land trusts in Latin America, 3 2 compared to the 1,667 in the
127 Diane Barthel, Historic Preservation: A Comparative Analysis, 4 Soc. F. 87, 88 (1989) (also
noting that in the United States nongovernmental associations filled this role); see also Nerys
Jones et al., The Role of Partnerships in Urban Forestry, in URBAN FORESTS AND TREES 186,
201 (Cecil C. Konijnendijk et al., eds., 2005) (describing private association holding recreational
woodland in Iceland).
128 Anheier & Salamon, supra note 77, at 95-96 (this is an unweighted average, and the U.S. is
included in the sample).
129 id.
0 Id. (developed countries' workforce in NPO sector is proportionately more than four times as
large as in developing countries).
131 Id. at 100; Burton A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private
Enterprise and Government, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 541, 542 (1997); THE CENTER FOR
GLOBAL PROSPERITY, HUDSON INST., THE INDEX OF GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY AND
REMITTANCES 54 (Patricia Miller ed., 2009) available at http://www.hudson.org/
files/documents/Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2009.pdf For case studies of
biodiversity conservation NGOs outside of the U.S., see INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF
NATURE &WORLD LAND TRUST, supra note 3, at 2-60.
132 COPE, supra note 3, at 13, Table 2.
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United States."' Proponents of private land restrictions may have to wait
until a particular county's nonprofit arena is willing and able, if ever, to
embark on this program. These proponents must recognize as well that
for many countries, conservation easements held by NPOs are not
currently a viable, let alone the preferred, means to preserve habitat and
open space.
B. THE SPECTER OF COLONIALISM
The underlying ethic of conservation easements raises important
social, political, and equity questions for a country considering whether
to embrace these interests. Some countries may choose to embrace
development to a higher degree than developed nations and reject
conservation as a "Western" priority. These issues must be addressed or
a conservation easement program will likely have little chance of
success.
1. ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY AND GLOBAL AGREEMENTS
Countries that suffered through colonialism, perhaps lasting
several centuries, have an understandable concern about control of their
resources and legal systems by external forces. Developing countries
attempting to use their natural resources to improve the lives of their
citizens to acceptable living standards are often skeptical of calls from
developed nations for land conservation for purposes ranging from
aesthetic to carbon sequestration.'34 They wonder why the burden of non-
development should fall on them. This tension has played out in various
global environmental initiatives between governments, such as the Kyoto
protocol, where developing nations fear they will be allocated inadequate
carbon emission levels to permit industrialization."' Environmental
'" ALDRICH & WYERMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
134 See JONATHAN S. ADAMS & THOMAS 0. MCSHANE, THE MYTH OF WILD AFRICA XVII-XIX
(1992) ("The entire modem conservation edifice rests on the ideals and visions of people other
than Africans."); Diana K. Davis, Neoliberalism, Environmentalism, and Agricultural
Restructuring in Morocco, 172 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 88 (2006) (questioning the "colonial
environmental narrative" that land degradation was due to local practices); Elizabeth Garland,
The Elephant in the Room: Confronting the Colonial Character of Wildhfe Conservation in
Africa, AFR. STUD. REV., Dec. 2008, at 51, 59 (2008) ("The unequal, and frequently racialized,
transnational aspects of African conservation practice remain something of an unacknowledged
elephant in the room.").
' See Adil Najam, Saleemul Huq & Youba Sokona, Climate Negotiations Beyond Kyoto:
Developing Countries' Concerns and Interests, 3 CLIMATE POL'Y 221, 223-26 (2003), available
at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/ierp/pdfs/NajamCliPol%20Climate%20and%20SD.pdf; MUSTAFA
BABIKER, JOHN M. REILLY & HENRY D. JACOBY, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 1-4 (1999), available at http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC
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equity issues have made finalization of international agreements
difficult."'
2. PRIVATE CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
There may be similar concerns with global initiatives promoting
private conservation restrictions. Neo-colonialism, cultural, and market
issues must be considered.
(a) NEOCOLONIALISM
If the introduction of conservation easements is seen as part of
an attempt of the developed world via the instrument of NGOs to achieve
preservation at the expense of the aspirations of developing countries, the
likelihood of adoption of this private conservation technique will
decrease. This will mirror the conflict that William H. Whyte warned of
with conservation easements in the United States between the "gentry"
favoring undisturbed open space and the rest of the population seeking
accessible recreational-or even developable-land."'
Some local parties have raised questions about the activities of
international NGOs-i.e., transnational, nongovernmental organizations
devoted to human rights, environmentalism, economic development, and
other causes-similar to concerns voiced about actions of foreign
governments.'38 Critics have charged international NGOs with imposing
Western biases on other countries, preferring universal principles to local
practices and cultures, and engaging in "cultural imperialism."'39 The
imposition of conservation on the developing world by global NGOs
might be viewed by some as motivated by a desire to yield
environmental and psychic benefits for the developed world, regardless
of any constraints this may cause for the host country. This may not in
fact be the impetus of NPOs and NGOs promoting conservation
easements, and there is much that demonstrates that these organizations
operate for salutary and altruistic motives. Nevertheless, the burdens
Rpt56.pdf; John Vidal, China Leads Accusation that Rich Nations Are Trying to Sabotage
Climate Treaty, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:02BST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/oct/05/climate-change-kyoto.
136 See Peter Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at
Al.
137 See supra Part II.B.3.
138 John Boli, International Nongovernmental Organizations, in The NON-PROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 77, 333, 333 (international NGOs are estimated at 6,000-
7,000 in number).
'3 Id. at 344.
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imposed by conservation restrictions are indeed real, and negative
perceptions must be countered.
(b) CULTURE AND LAW
The drive to introduce American-style conservation easements to
other countries could trigger additional resistance if, as in much of the
world, the traditional "conservation easement" is a legal concept that
diverges from the host nation's legal system and property rights matrix
and is viewed as an imposed "foreign" device. 14 0 Also, there might likely
be problems enforcing new formal legal rules that are inconsistent with
informal local practices and norms,141 especially if the formal rule is
viewed as serving foreign interests.
Private conservation easements may run up against historical
conflicts in a given country. For example, some countries are still
addressing a pattern of a small number of large landholders and a large
population that does not own land.142 In response, one country instituted a
reform that makes land that is not cultivated or ranched subject to
expropriation (and ultimate redistribution); there is a risk that land held
for conservation purposes could be so seized.143
(c) EFFICACY OF MARKET SOLUTIONS
It must be determined whether the market model of conservation
easements-where the landowner is compensated for foregoing
development rights-is viable or appropriate in a particular country and
culture. Experience with environmental treaties between nations has
shown that payments have not "trickled down" to the affected
landowners. Typically, payments made by other nations to restrict
development to achieve carbon sequestration or habitat preservation are
made to the government and do not get in the hands of the people who
actually live in the area and are losing resources from the new
140 See supra Part III.C.
141 See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 181.
142 See, e.g., Tim Hanstad, Roy L. Prosterman & Robert Mitchell, Poverty, Law and Land Tenure
Reform, in ONE BILLION RISING: LAW, LAND AND THE ALLEVIATION OF GLOBAL POVERTY 17,
31-37 (Roy L. Prosterman et al., eds., 2009); see Cheryl Walker, Agrarian Change, Gender and
Land Reform: A South Africa Case Study (United Nations Research Inst. for Social Dev., Soc.
Policy and Dev. Programme Paper No. 10, 2002), available at http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/
website/document.nsf/%28httpPublications%29/C1DBAEB28DE8DO74C1256CO8004694EE?O
penDocument.
143 Byron Swift et al., Private Lands Conservation in Latin America: The Need for Enhanced Legal
Tools and Incentives, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 85, 97-99 (2004).
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measures.'" This may often lead to conflict between those individuals
and global environmental goals, and might cause enforcement issues.14
Additionally, a Western, market-based incentive system of
conservation may clash with local values. It has been argued that existing
nonmonetary (e.g., communal, cultural) pressures for environmental
preservation of land may be preferable and more effective than monetary
means. 14 6 Moreover, introducing cash payments may undermine existing
conservation customs. 14 7
3. POSSIBLE APPROACHES
The decision as to whether a given nation should adopt private
conservation restrictions of some variety is one that should be made
alone by that sovereign nation. When proposing or recommending (as
advisers) conservation easements in other countries, care must be taken
to engage and collaborate with the host country to examine if the model,
or some variation, can work. The economic interests, people, culture,
priorities, norms, and legal systems of the host country must be
recognized and respected, while solutions to broad based conservation
goals are sought.' Even if a landowner voluntarily agrees to a restriction
and receives compensation for it, the limitation will likely be more
successfully enforced if there is a demonstrable, clear benefit to personal,
local, and national interests.
If a country turns to outside advisers or partners on conservation
restriction issues, these advisers and partners must clearly respect the
national autonomy of the host country in advising on models and in
eventual conservation restriction projects. Indeed, there are examples of
sophisticated global NGOs, such as The Nature Conservancy, laudably
working in partnership with local interests to achieve a preservation goal
144 Di Leva, supra note 17, at 90.
145 See Barry Bearak, Tottering Rule in Madagascar Can't Save Falling Rosewoods, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2010, at Al (quoting reaction of an illegal harvester of rare trees in national parks in the
face of outcry from global environmental groups: "God gave us the forest so that we could take
what we need. My ancestors are not angry. There are still many trees in the forest.").
146 Wunder, supra note 65, at 4.
147 id.
148 See Fikret Berkes, Community-Based Conservation in a Globalized World, 104 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. Sci. U.S. 15188 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/104/39/
15188.full.pdf+html. In implementing global accords such as the Kyoto protocol, according to
the World Bank, the key to success in countries such as Bolivia and Costa Rica has been the
linking of global ideas to domestic interests, players, and political skills. WORLD BANK, supra
note 3, at 161. "Attuned to ideas from abroad but deeply immersed in domestic social
movements and policy debates, these countries have been at the forefront of an impressive record
of environmental policy innovations." Id.
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that meets the needs of the host country and region.149 These
collaborative efforts by private groups are analogous to "community
natural resources management" or "community-based conservation,"
where the central government involves local or indigenous institutions or
people in conservation decisions as it attempts to balance traditional
values, development goals, and conservation methods.'5 o By being open
to the legal systems and values of others and by using partnerships,
outside conservation advocates will be more likely to develop programs
that respect national and personal autonomy, culture and heritage, and
democratic values."' Moreover, local input and cooperation may increase
the likelihood of success of the conservation program.152
C. CIVIL LAw HURDLES TO PRIVATE CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Assuming that a country desired to implement conservation
easements after evaluating the various policies, existing law may present
obstacles. There are various reasons why traditional civil law systems do
not provide fertile ground for the adoption and use of conservation
easements. These include the prohibition of in gross interests, rejection
of affirmative obligations, and the numerus clausus principle. This would
suggest that alterations to existing rules or specific conservation
"easement" legislation, as well as a shift in civil law conceptualizations,
would be required to permit private conservation easements in gross
under traditional civil law. While there are variations and exceptions
149 See, e.g., Daniel White, Africa: Exploring Parks and Partnerships Along the Zambezi, THE
NATURE CONSERVANCY (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/africa/
facesofconservation/up-the-zambezi-life-along-one-of-africas-longest-rivers.xml (describing The
Nature Conservancy's new initiatives in community-based conservation); WORLD BANK, supra
note 3, at 161-62; Margaret Southern, In Costa Rica, There's Strength in Numbers, THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/centralamerica/
costaricalexplore/cr-chocolate.xml (describing TNC's work with local inhabitants to manage
ecotourism); see Boli, supra note 135, at 344.
1so Stephen R. Kellert, Jai N. Mehta, Syma A. Ebbin & Laly L. Lichtenfeld, Community Natural
Resource Management: Promise, Rhetoric, and Reality, 13 Soc'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 705, 706
(2000); see Tomas M. Koontz & Craig W. Thomas, What Do We Know and Need to Know About
the Environmental Outcomes of Collaborative Management?, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 111 (2006).
's' See generally Mark Roseland, Sustainable Community Development: Integrating Environmental,
Economic and Social Objectives, 54 PROGRESS IN PLAN. 73 (2000) (discussing the democratic
process).
152 See Fikret Berkes, Rethinking Community-Based Conservation, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
621, 622 (2004) ("More inclusive, people-oriented and community-based approaches to
conservation are in part a reaction to the failures of exclusionary conservation, in a world in
which social and economic factors are increasingly seen as key to conservation success."). The
data and results of community-based approaches are not yet clear. See Kellert et al, supra note
150, at 707; Koontz & Thomas, supra note 150.
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among civil law countries, some generalizations about the issues may be
offered.
1. PROHIBITION OF IN GROSS INTERESTS
Traditional civil law regimes, stemming from the Roman model,
do not recognize in gross servitudes.'" Rather, they contemplate that a
"predial" (aka "praedial") servitude-i.e., a property right running with
the landl5 4 -can only be created between two pieces of land. For
example, the laws of France,'" Italy,' South Africa,' Greece,"
Quebec,159 and Argentina"'o require a burdened and benefitted parcel. The
Louisiana Civil Code, the only U.S. jurisdiction with a predominantly
civil law tradition, similarly requires the existence of two parcels of land
to create a predial servitude.'"' The requirement of a benefitted parcel
frustrates the basic model of in gross private conservation easements,
where a nonprofit organization holds a right over land without owning a
neighboring property.
The rejection of in gross servitudes appears to be rooted in
history, as Roman law required two parcels.'62 Scholars have noted that
the post-Revolution, nineteenth century French civil code generally
sought to limit servitude law as it had been expanded during feudal times
as a means for lords to exact additional income from tenants.163
1 JAMES GORDLEY & ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW: READINGS, CASES, MATERIALS 198 (2006).
154 3 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 3 (4th ed.
2010); see generally Paul McCarthy, The Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in France and
Belgium: Judicial Discretion and Urban Planning, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1973).
. GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 153, at 198 (quoting CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.] arts. 637, 638
(Fr.)).
See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 92 (2006) for a discussion of Italian Civil Code art. 1027.
15 See C.G. van der Merwe, Law of Property, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA
201, 224 (C.G. van der Merwe & Jacques E. du Plessis eds., 2004) for a discussion of how South
African property law is mainly influenced by Roman-Dutch law, rather than English common
law.
158 See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PREDIAL SERVITUDES §§ 3, 9
(3d ed. 2010) for a discussion of Greek Civil Code art. 1118.
s5 Qu6bec Civil Code, S.Q. 1991 c. 64 s. 1177.
60 C6d. Civ. art. 2971 (2011) (Arg.), available at http://www.justiniano.com/codigosjuridicos/
codigosargentina.htm.
161 See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 158, § 3; La. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 646 (2011).
162 See GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 153, at 198.
163 Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Fragmentation of Property Rights: A Functional
Interpretation ofthe Law ofServitudes 12 (Geo. Mason U. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 03-
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Commentators have also suggested that the requirement of both
dominant and servient lots helps to "avoid the proliferation and undue
encumbrance of the land,"'" echoing some of the anti-restrictions
proclamations of common law courts.16 1
Some proponents of land restrictions have argued that
"conservation easements" are permissible under the current legal systems
of Latin American and have, in fact, been created.'66 They claim that it is
possible to create a real property right that could restrict an owner from
doing certain things-presumably altering environmental features-on
the property. These rights, however, are not true "conservation
easements" as understood in the U.S. context as they require that such
agreements be between two property owners.'16 This would require the
NGO to purchase a property neighboring or somehow related to every
parcel on which they seek a conservation right in order to "anchor" it.
This would add at the minimum great expense and, in some cases, it may
be impossible as a practical matter to acquire an anchor. The civil code
tradition of Latin America and its rejection of in gross rights frustrate the
efficacy of the conservation concept. It appears that as of 2005, all
''conservation easements" in Latin American have been appurtenant
rather than in gross.'
A few civil law countries have more recently adopted an interest
often known as a "limited personal servitude," which serves as a charge
on the servient land in favor of a person rather than a dominant
property.' German"' and Greek"' codes provide for such rights, which
might include the right to take fruit from a property or fishing or hunting
rights.'72 Even in the few civil law nations that have adopted limited
personal servitudes, this interest is not likely a sufficient vehicle for a
conservation restriction as limited personal servitudes are typically not
24, 2003), available at http://www.law.gmu.edulassets/files/publications/workingjpapers/03-
24.pdf.
'6 van der Merwe, supra note 157, at 224.
165 See supra Part I.B.
166 See generally COPE, supra note 3.
67 Id. at 9 (quoting the definition of the conservation easement in Latin America as "a real property
right established by the agreement of two or more property owners . . .
68 Id. at 13.
69 GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 153, at 92.
no See GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 156, at 92 for a discussion of German Civil Code §
1090.
... A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 231.
"' Id. § 231.
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transferable"' and not perpetual. Rights held by individuals terminate on
death, and those held by juridical beings terminate upon dissolution"' or
after a period of years set by the code."' Proponents of U.S. conservation
easements found these types of shortcomings to be antithetical to
successful restrictions." 6
2. AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATIONS ON SERVIENT OWNER
Moreover, traditional civil law does not recognize a servitude
that creates an affirmative obligation on the servient owner, but rather
typically prevents the servient land's owner from performing acts on the
property, such as a building restriction, or gives the dominant owner the
right to do something on the burdened land, such as a right of way."'
There are some examples, nevertheless, of civil law courts allowing an
affirmative obligation ancillary to an otherwise valid predial servitude,'78
but it is risky to rely on such judicial leniency in light of code provisions
that do not contemplate imposing affirmative duties on the owner of the
servient land. Thus, in a civil law regime, a conservation servitude might
not be enforceable to the extent that it obligates the servient owner to
perform affirmative acts,"' such as maintenance of the easement area,8 o
that are typically required in U.S. conservation easements.
'7 See GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 153, at 203, for a discussion of German Civil Code §
1092.
174 AN. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 14; A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 158, § 4.
175 South African law terminates personal servitudes held by a "juristic person" after 100 years. van
der Merwe, supra note 157, at 224.
176 Louisiana, however, has rejected the restraints on limited personal servitudes by providing for
their full transferability and heritability. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 643-44 (2011). As discussed
below, Louisiana has adopted Conservation Servitude Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1271 et seq.
(2011).
" GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 153, at 198; A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 158, § 14.
178 See Parisi & Depoorter, supra note 163, at 41, citing Lebbe v. Pelseneer, [1965] J. Trib. 87 (Cour
d'appel, Bruxelles, 1964) (upholding an obligation to build and plant a yard as part of a servitude
not to construct a building in front of a house).
17 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 158, § 4, n.4 and accompanying text.
180 Frequently Asked Questions About Conservation Easements, ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, http://www.floridaswater.com/landmanagement/
conservationeasements.html (last visited May 23, 2011) (protecting easement is duty of servient
owner); Benefits of Saving Land, MONTGOMERY COUNTY LANDS TRUST,
http://www.mclt.org/benefits.htm (last visited May 23, 2011) (discussing the duty of
maintenance on fee owner); Easement FAQ, MINNESOTA LAND TRUST,
http://www.mnland.org/easement-faq/ (last visited May 23, 2011) (fee owner has duty to
maintain).
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3. NUMERUS CLAUSUS AND THE LIMITS ON JUDICIAL LAW
Finally, the doctrine of numerus clausus (literally, "the number
is closed")' prevents parties and courts in civil law countries from
creating property interests not specifically recognized by the governing
code.'82 The code is recognized as the sole source of the law, and the
numerus clausus concept is an express corollary of that concept. 83 The
code will typically delineate the types and content of absolute property
rights, such as mortgages and servitudes, defining what each right means
and bestows.'" The parties cannot create by contract or transfer rights not
recognized in the code, nor can the courts invent new obligations; the
only way to increase or decrease the types of interests of the rights is by
legislation to amend the code.' The principle of numerus clausus also
exists, albeit not by that name, in other code-based countries such as
China.'
The numerus clausus rule, combined with a law of servitudes
that allows only a limited number of discrete interests, has the effect of
denying property owners the freedom to carve out efficient, personally
rewarding, and socially beneficial property rights. Under the common
law system, however, courts, along with legislatures, have the power to
make binding, precedential law. Moreover, there is no formal doctrine of
numerus clausus in the common law, and courts have expanded legal
rights and interests significantly, based on the agreements of the parties
181 John Merryman, Comment, Policy, Autonomy, and Numerus Clausus in Italian and American
Property Law, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 224 (1963).
182 MATTEI, supra note 12, at 39; Sjef Van Erp, Comparative Property Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1043, 1053 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10 (2000); Parisi & Depoorter,
supra note 163, at 13; and Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law,
61 VAND. L. REv. 1597 (2008).
18 Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 10-11.
'" Van Erp, supra note 182, at 1053.
8 See MATTEI, supra note 12, at 91; Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 10; Jan M. Smits, Applied
Evolutionary Theory: Explaining Legal Change in Transnational and European Private Law, 9
GERMAN L.J. 477, 485 (2008); and J.H. Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational
Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 339, 350-51 n.21 (2008), for a discussion of
questioning the claimed benefits of standardization of numerus clausus versus the cost of loss of
contractual autonomy. There are but rare instances in a few countries where the parties' contract
has been allowed to trump this doctrine. Van Erp, supra note 182, at 1054.
186 See Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the
Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 317, 347 (2008) for a discussion
of referencing Article 5 of the Property Law; Parisi & Depoorter, supra note 163, at n.43, for a
discussion of stating that the principle exists under other non-civil law, albeit code, jurisdictions
such as Korea, Thailand, Japan, Ethiopia, and Argentina.
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and public policy considerations."' Much of the pioneering of
conservation easements in the United States came by parties operating
under the common law ground rules that provide that courts have the
power to legitimize newly developing property interests by extending,
manipulating, and sometimes overruling existing doctrines."' Thus, the
early proponents of conservation easements claimed that no enabling
statutes were necessary to validate these interests and maintained that the
judicial system could and would ultimately sustain these interests.'89
These proponents made the case for convincing courts of the validity of
conservation easements based on minority-view American case law and
policy.'9
D. OTHER PROPERTY SYSTEM ISSUES
Additionally, other variations in property rights concepts in civil
law and non-civil law countries present hurdles to the adoption of
American-style conservation easements.
1. ADEQUATE TITLE SYSTEMS AND ENFORCEMENT
As a fundamental prerequisite, there must be a sufficiently
developed property rights regime in a given country to sustain
investment in and enforcement of a conservation easement right. The
conservation restriction must be clearly recognized and accepted by
parties and the legal system so that people will be willing to enter into
such arrangements without high premiums for transaction costs or
discounts for uncertainty. There also must be a registration system to
' While Merrill & Smith state that there is no formal numerus clausus principle, supra note 182, at
10-11, they assert that common law judges nevertheless adhere to a similar philosophy,
recognizing only a closed list of property rights. Id. Moreover, Merrill & Smith describe the
efficiency benefits of this standardization. See also John A. Lovett, Meditations on Strathclyde:
Controlling Private Land Use Restrictions at the Crossroads of Legal Systems, 36 SYR. J. INT'L
L. & COM. 1, 8 (2008). While it is true that common law courts might not create brand new
property interests sui generis, Merrill & Smith appear to underplay the power and track record of
common law courts to expand or contract traditional property interests while purporting to
maintain traditional boundaries. See, e.g., Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977)
(describing judicial revolutionizing of common law tenancy by the entirety by reworking rights
of husbands and wives). See supra note 185 for additional examples.
18 See, e.g., Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (court applies nuisance law to find owner
has right to receive sunlight to solar-heated residence, essentially creating new variety of
servitude); Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches), 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994)
(recognizing increased use of public trust doctrine as essentially an expansion of traditional
prescriptive easement law); see also Sara C. Bronin, Modem Lights, 80 U. CoLO. L. REv. 881
(2009) (arguing for judicial adaptation of current water law doctrine to validate solar rights).
'8 See, e.g., BRENNEMAN, supra note 15, at 58.
19 See supra notes 27-31 & accompanying text.
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demonstrate adequately that the purported owner of the property has title
to the land sufficient for the conveyance of an easement, and the system
must accept an in rem conservation right for registration or recording.19
Additionally, there must be a sufficient rule of law to enforce
conservation easement rights and to deter potential violators. Ownership
and enforcement rights must extend to non-domestic entities if global
NGOs hold the interests, or sufficient local partners or affiliates must
hold the conservation right. Without reliable and defensible title for the
grantor and grantee of a conservation right, parties will be unlikely to
enter into such transactions.
2. COMMUNAL RIGHTS
Some legal systems may include other property interests that run
counter to privately held conservation rights. For example, the Swedish
tradition of "Allemansritt" permits any person to have passage over and
to camp on woodlands and fields owned by others, as well as the right to
gather wild flowers and mushrooms.'92 Conservation easements barring
changes in the environmental condition of such lands would run afoul of
this tradition. Similarly, extensive practice of "common lands" in some
legal systems may prevent the acquisition of conservation easements
since there may be no "owner" with authority to grant rights over the
common land.'93 Finally, squatters may have acquired rights of
ownership trumping that of record owners.'94
Thus, in order to have a successful regime of private
conservation restrictions, certain conditions must exist in the adopting
country. The NPO sector must be willing and with sufficient capacity to
191 See Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing Countries, 13 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 647, 652 (1998); Hugh A. Brodkey, Land Title Issues for Countries in Transition:
The American Experience, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 799, 799 (1996).
192 HENRI A.L. DEKKER, THE INVISIBLE LINE: LAND REFORM, LAND TENURE SECURITY AND LAND
REGISTRATION 69 (2003).
193 Philip Burnham, Whose Forest? Whose Myth? Conceptualisations of Community Forests in
Cameroon, in LAW, LAND AND ENVIRONMENT: MYTHICAL LAND, LEGAL BOUNDARIES 31, 38-
40 (Allen Abramson & Dimitrios Theodossopoulos eds., 2000) (describing legacy of the
different land ownership laws of French and English colonial rule in Cameroon and the current
conflict between traditional common property notions and privatization and state ownership
proposals); Veronica Strang, Not So Black and White: The Effects of Aboriginal Law on
Australian Legislation, in LAW, LAND AND ENVIRONMENT: MYTHICAL LAND, LEGAL
BOUNDARIES, supra, 93, 100 (describing legislation introducing Aboriginal concepts of
community owned land into the dominant legal model of private ownership); Dekker, supra note
192, at 66 (referring to commons in Africa).
194 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000); and Winter King, Illegal
Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 HARv. INT'L L. J. 433 (2003).
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hold the restrictions; private restrictions based on market solutions have
to be consistent with cultural norms and avoid equity issues among
nations; and the legal system and existing rule of law must be receptive
to the validation and enforcement of conservation restrictions.
IV. PRIVATE CONSERVATION ALTERNATIVES TO "IN
GROSS CONSERVATION EASEMENTS"
When other nations encounter legal or policy impediments to
employing in gross private conservation easements, in some countries,
NGOs may employ other consensual less-than-fee vehicles to preserve
environmental conditions.' (These are in addition to appurtenant
servitudes for conservation purposes that may be,"' and have been,'"
created under the civil law.) These alternatives may not have all the
features of U.S.-style conservation easements because of limited
duration, an appurtenancy requirement, lack of in rem status, and limited
scope, etc. These alternatives may, however, be appropriate interim or
final resolutions in light of a particular country's social and economic
aspirations, title issues, and legal structure.
A. PAYMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
One alternative to the U.S.-style conservation easement is a
privately financed "Payment for Environmental Services," known as PES
(or by similar names such as a "Conservation Performance Payment").19 8
These are contracts requiring payments on a set schedule by a private
party to a landowner for refraining from environmental degradation of
the land.'" As contracts, they should be enforceable in both common
law, civil law, and most other legal systems, subject to local
requirements. Private funders of PESs may include "service users," such
.s For an in-depth examination of vehicles and case studies for private conservation in Latin
America, see ENVTL. L. INST., LEGAL TOOLS AND INCENTIVES FOR PRIVATE LANDS
CONSERVATION IN LATIN AMERICA: BUILDING MODELS FOR SUCCESS 149-50 (2003); see also
Telesetsky, supra note 4, at 759-63 (suggesting a "modified conservation easement" with a
duration equal to one generation, but renewable).
' See supra Part IILC. 1 (discussing appurtenant servitudes under civil law).
'9 See, e.g., COPE, supra note 3, at 14, Table 4; ENVTL. L. INS., supra note 195, at 45, 109, 121,
139.
1 See WUNDER, supra note 65 at 1; Ferraro, supra note 65 at 993-96.
' Typically the PES will be for the purpose of protection of landscape beauty, carbon
sequestration, watershed protection, and biodiversity protection. Sometimes, government will
essentially act as the agent of private parties seeking conservation by taxing them and then
purchasing the PES, thus lending authority and legitimacy to the transaction. Sven Wunder,
Essay, The Efficiency of Payments for Environmental Services in Tropical Conservation, 21
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 48, 51 (2007).
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as a safari operator interested in preserving landscape values for its
business or a water company seeking to maintain the integrity of its
watershed, or NGOs seeking to vindicate ecological goals. 200 The term of
a PES is limited and typically short term, with the parties able to renew
the arrangement, perhaps at a longer term.201
The limited term of the PES is a great disadvantage when
compared to the perpetual preservation of a conservation easement. The
environmental benefits of a PES will last only as long as payments-and
funding for payments-continue.2 02 Moreover, as a purely contractual
arrangement, it does not appear that the typical PES would be an in rem
right, enforceable against the land itself and binding purchasers of the
preserved land.203 There is some confusion on terminology, as it appears
that some non-perpetual, non-in rem, contract-based rights between
landowners are sometimes referred to as "conservation easements,"
perhaps because that term is considered a gold standard in conservation
efforts. But in reality, rights not assertable against the property itself, and
only for short terms, should not fairly be described as conservation
easements. For example, one line of the literature describes the rights
held by the government in Costa Rica as PES arrangements,204 while
others trumpet them as conservation easements.205 The only way to truly
tell is through close analysis of the governing legislation and
documentation of each transaction. Attempting to label the interests does
not advance understanding and may reinforce concerns about the
imposition of American legal vehicles.206
200 Sven Wunder et al., Taking Stock: A Comparative Analysis of Payments for Environmental
Services Programs in Developed and Developing Countries, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 834, 835
(2008).
201 See Ferraro, supra note 65, at 995 ("Performance payments are also amendable to the short time
period during which conservation objectives must be met."); Wunder, et al., supra note 200, at
846-47.
202 See Wunder et al., supra note 200, at 846.
203 This would be especially true in civil law jurisdictions as the PES is not authorized by the code
as a valid property right and thus would violate the numerus clausus principle. See supra Part
III.C.3.
204 Costa Rica has a comprehensive national PES program that has been highly successful in
reversing deforestation, administered by the government. Costa Rica Ley Forestal 7575 (enacted
1996), http://www.pgr.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm repartidor.asp?paraml=
NRTC&nValorl=1&nValor2=4166 1&nValor3=74079&param2=1 &strTipM=TC&IResultado=2
&strSim=simp; see also Stefano Pagiola, Payments for Environmental Services in Costa Rica, 65
ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 712, 712 (2008); Subak, supra note 6; Ferraro, supra note 65, at 994;
WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 171-72.
205 See, e.g., COPE, supra note 3, at 12-15; Swift, supra note 143, at 115.
206 Adding even more confusion is that a conservation easement can be thought of as a type of PES,
but creating a property right rather than a mere contract right.
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PESs have some useful features. First, by casting these as
contract rights, parties avoid the rule of most civil law regimes that bar
the enforcement of an in gross property right.207 A host country and its
citizens may see the acquisition of a contract right by a global NGO as
less of a foreign intrusion than the purchase of a fee or lesser property
interest. Moreover, when land titles in the country are insecure, the
limited term prevents the NGO from paying up front for a longer- or
perpetual-conservation right where title is not enforceable or the
"owner" in reality lacks title. The structure of ongoing payments forces
the owner to continue to comply for the entire term of the PES in order to
receive compensation.20 s The owner thus has an incentive to protect the
environment, and the dynamic between the owner and the environmental
NGO shifts from adversarial to collaborative.209 Compared to a
conservation easement, the landowner has an interest in compliance,
something that is not always the case with U.S. owners subject to
conservation easements.2"o Finally, as with conservation easements, PESs
offer the benefits of private acquisition, NGO administration, and a
consensual rather than a regulatory approach.2 1'
There has been limited use of PES programs involving
nongovernmental entities in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.212 Some
noteworthy examples include an arrangement by a nonprofit (Fundaci6n
Natura) in Los Negros, Bolivia to protect threatened cloud forest habitat
of migratory birds213 and a contract obtained by Cedenera, an NGO, to
protect watershed in Pimampiro, Ecuador.214 A 2006 inventory of PES
projects in Sub-Sahara Africa found only eighteen projects, a minority of
which were performance based (i.e., true PESs).2 15 In contrast, Latin
207 See supra Part III.C.
208 See Wunder, supra note 199, at 50.
209 Ferraro, supra note 65, at 995.
210 See Nature Conservancy, Inc. v. Sims, No. 07-112-JMH 2009 WL 602031 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 5,
2009) (enforcing conservation easement against owner who regarded the property); Windham
Land Trust v. Jeffords, 967 A.2d 690 (Me. 2009) (enforcing a conservation easement against an
owner who planned commercial use of the land and admission of the public).
211 See supra Part II.
212 See Wunder et al., supra note 200.
213 See Nigel Asquith et al., Selling Two Environmental Services: In-Kind Payments for Bird
Habitat and Watershed Protection in Los Negros, Bolivia, 65 EcOLOGICAL ECON. 675 (2008).
214 See Sven Wunder & Montserrat Albin, Decentralized Payments for Environmental Services: The
Cases ofPimampiro and PROFAFOR in Ecuador, 65 ECOLOGICAL EcoN. 685 (2008).
215 Paul J. Ferraro, Regional Review for Payments of Watershed Services: Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 J.
SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY 525, 527-29 (2009); see Sissel Waage et al., A Scoping Assessment of




America has a larger number of PES arrangements.216 This disparity has
been attributed to weaker financial condition of potential purchasing
entities in Africa, 2 17 especially high transaction costs, 218 and less reliable
legal enforcement of contracts.219
B. CHILE'S PROPOSED DERECHO REAL DE CONSERVACION
There is currently a legislative proposal in Chile to create a new
right under the Chilean civil code called a derecho real de conservaci6n
(i.e., a real right of conservation). 220 The proposal expressly denotes the
interest as a real estate right,221 permits it to be held by nonprofit
organizations as well as by the government,222 and allows for perpetual
duration.23 There is no requirement that the right be appurtenant to a
benefited property, thus in gross rights should be permitted. The right is
for "environmental conservation" goals, defined as protection of
biodiversity, species, habitat, and ecosystems, as well as the prevention
of environmental deterioration.2 4 The legislation also allows the interest
holder a right of access to inspect the burdened property to determine
compliance.225 As of this writing, the proposal is still pending in the
legislature.
There are several salutary aspects to the Chilean approach. First,
the legislative proposal resulted from collaboration of The Nature
Conservancy (a U.S. NGO also engaged in global issues)226 with local
constituencies interested in conservation activities and in creating a
lasting conservation right, thus bringing outside expertise to in-country
stakeholders and decision makers.227 Second, there were indications that
the social, economic, and political conditions in Chile were ripe for the
216 Ferraro, supra note 215, at 535.
217 Id. at 536-39.
218 Id. at 539-40.
219 Id. at 540.
220 Henry Tepper & Victoria Alonso, The Private Lands Conservation Initiative in Chile, in
CONSERVATION CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAS, 49, 58-59 (James N. Levitt ed., 2010).
221 Article 2 of Bill to Establish Derecho Real de Conservaci6n (copy of English version kept on file
by author.)
222 Id. at art. 5.
223 Id. at art. 8(4).
224 Id. at arts. 4, 7.
225 Id. at art. 11(5).
226 BREWER, supra note 15, at 207-08. The Nature Conservancy established its International
Program in 1980, first focusing on the Caribbean and Latin America and then expanding to other
regions. The Nature Conservancy worked within countries to help support their national parks
and to protect infringement on them, as these parks provided important biodiversity.
227 Tepper & Alonso, supra note 220, at 50-51.
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creation of a property-based, long-term conservation right.228
Additionally, the proposed legislation does not attempt to impose the
common law conservation easement on civil law, but rather offers a new
interest-the derecho real de conservaci6n-that the civil code would
embrace.229 This flexible, locally-based approach finesses the concerns of
"legal imperialism" and respects existing legal regimes.
C. LEASES
If in gross servitudes are not legally permitted for fees, a sale-
leaseback arrangement could be employed to create in gross conservation
restrictions attached to the leasehold rights. For example, in England,
easements230 and covenants23 ' are not enforceable in gross against
successors.232 Therefore, a conservation organization could not acquire a
conservation easement from a fee owner. If, however, the owner
conveyed the fee to an NPO, the organization could lease the property
back to the former fee owner on a long term, automatically renewable
lease, but including an express conservation covenant binding the tenant
not to disturb ecological features.233 The former owner would have full
right of possession as tenant; and, since covenants in leaseholds are
enforceable by the landlord against the tenant in England and both the
landlord and the tenant can assign the lease,234 the conservation covenant
would bind successors to the leasehold estate. The preservation goal
could thus be achieved.
The difficulty with this approach is that many owners would
likely be unwilling to relinquish fee ownership in this manner even
though the leasehold will give them and their successors potentially
infinite possession. This arrangement may be more acceptable in
228 Id. at 51-54.
229 Id at 58.
230 See In Re Ellenborough Park, [1955] 3 WLR 892 (Eng.); SPENCER G. MAURICE, GALE ON
EASEMENTS 7-8 (14th ed. 1972); see also PAUL Burr & NEIL DUCKWORTH, PROPERTY LAW
AND PRACTICE 2008/2009 at 25 (2008).
231 See Stillwell v. Blackman [1967] EWHC (Ch) 767, 1 W.L.R. 375 (Eng.). England also bars the
running of the burden of affirmative covenants, so repair obligations on conservation easements
may not be enforceable. See also BUTr & DUCKWORTH, supra note 230, at 30.
232 See infra Part V.
233 The provisions in leases preventing destruction of environmental features would essentially be an
express modification of the law of waste, which limits alterations that a tenant can make to the
premises.
234 See Spencer's Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (Q.B.) (running burden of leasehold covenant to
assignee of tenant); BUTT & DUCKWORTH, supra note 230, at 44-45, 363.
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countries where residential ground leases are common, such as in
portions of England."'
D. EASEMENTS CONTROLLED BY GOVERNMENT
By definition, a private conservation easement is held and
enforced by a private (nonprofit) organization. Governmentally-owned
conservation easements are common in the United States,236 but by
definition they do not offer the benefits of private initiative and action.
In other countries, especially in civil law nations where private
easements in gross would challenge existing legal paradigms, a good first
step towards conservation property rights held by NGOs might be the
adoption of governmental conservation property rights. By way of
example, depending on definition, some of Costa Rica's governmentally
held rights may be considered true conservation easements.237
Three Mexican states have enacted legislation that permits
conservation easements to be held by NGOs, provided that the easements
are approved by the government and the easement land becomes part of
the state-protected conservation land system.2 " While the requirement of
government approval may inject the difficulties of bureaucracy and
governmental inaction, the involvement of government does help to
address the concerns with current acquisition of American private
conservation easements where there is no community or regional
planning to set up an integrated easement plan.2 39 Governmental approval
of easements is not necessarily a roadblock to success of a conservation
easement program, provided that there is a reasonably efficient,
235 See HERMANN MUTHEESIUS 2 THE ENGLISH HOUSE 13-15 (Dennis Sharp ed. 2007) (describing
history through the nineteenth century and royal ownership; a considerable amount of residential
and commercial land "owners" in London, for example, hold only ground leases with the
underlying freehold held by others, formerly royals and now often investment funds); Chris
Hamnett, UNEQUAL CITY: LONDON IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 141-43 (2003); CATHERINE
FARVACQUE & PATRICK MCAUSLAN, REFORMING URBAN LAND POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 48 (1992); Susanne Gray, What's the Diference Between Freehold
and Leasehold?, LUDLOWTHOMPSON.COM,http://www.udlowthompson.com/propertyadvice/
Whats the differencebetween freeholdand_1easeholdlarticle.htmid=16 (last visited May 22,
2011) (describing current practices in London).
236 See supra note 9.
237 See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
23. ENVTL. L. INST., supra note 195, at 149-50 (citing the states of Quintana Roo, Veracruz, and
Nuevo Leon); Swift et al., supra note 195, at 116-17 (same); see Veracruz Ley Estatal de
Proteccion Ambiental de Veracrux (Veracruz Environmental Protection Act) Arts. 77-81
(defining conservation easement), 76 (governmental approval) (2000), available at
http://info4.juridicas.unam.mx/adprojus/leg/3J/1016/.
2 See supra Part II.B.4, 6.
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transparent bureaucracy. For example, conservation easements have
thrived in Massachusetts, which is the one U.S. state that requires both
local and state approval of conservation easements.240
E. USUFRUCT
Under civil law regimes, property owners can create a right of
usufruct in another person. While there are differences between
countries, usufructs generally grant the holder the right to use and enjoy
the land, subject to the obligation to preserve the property.24 1 More
specifically, the holder of a usufruct has the right to possession and "to
derive the utility, profits, and advantages" that the property may
produce.242 Usufructs can be created only for a limited time period.243
Typically, usufructs expire on the death of the holder. 2' For juridical
persons, such as corporations, the traditional civil code approach is to
limit the duration of a usufruct to twenty245 or thirty years, 246 though some
countries have recently extended the duration of the usufruct to the
potentially infinite "life" of the entity.2 47
There are a variety of approaches and much nuance 24 8 on the
transferability of a usufruct. Some civil codes bar transferability in all
cases,249  others prohibit transferability unless the parties provide
240 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (2011).
2 Code Civil [C. CIV.] art. 578 (Fr.); C6digo Civil [C6D. CIV.][Civil Code] Book III, Title XII, art.
2812, 2817 (Arg.), available at http://www.justiniano.com/codigos juridicos/
codigo civil/codciv.htm; Astikos Kodikas [A.K.][Civil Code] art. 1142 (Greece); Erlax
Properties (Pty) Ltd. v. Registrar of Deeds 1991 (1) SA 879 (A) at 888 (S. Afr.); KERT
STAVORN, USUFRUCTS IN THAILAND, SIAM LEGAL, www.siam-legal.com/realestate/pdf-
file/usufruct.pdf; L.F.E. Goldie, Comment, Title and Use (and Usufruct)-An Ancient Distinction
Too Oft Forgot, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 689, 691-92 (1989); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, §
4; AN. Yiannopoulos, Usufruct: General Principles, Louisiana and Comparative Law, 27 LA.
L. REV. 369 (1967). In some ways, a usufruct resembles the life estate of the common law. James
Gordley, The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1815, 1859 (2000).
242 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 539 (2010).
243 LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 539.
244 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 4.
245 C6digo Civil [C6D. CIv.][Civil Code] Book III, Title XII, art. 2812 (Arg.).
246 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 608; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 619 (Fr.); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra
note 154, §16.
247 Astikos Kodikas [A.K.][Civil Code] art. 1142 (Greece); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154,
§16.
248 See A.J. McClean, The Common Law Life Estate and the Civil Law Usufruct: A Comparative
Study, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 649, 659 (1963).
249 AN. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 37, citing German B.G.B. § 1059 (usufructs held by
natural persons); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Law of Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 42 (2004). Roman law barred transferability. Boris Kozolchyk, Modernization of
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otherwise,25 and still others permit transferability as a matter of right
provided the transferor makes certain guarantees to the owner of the
underlying property.25' There are also differences among commentators
as to whether a purchaser of the underlying property is bound by a pre-
existing usufruct.252
Usufructs have been used to create conservation restrictions by
the owner granting the right to enjoy conservation values to a
conservation group.253 One benefit of this device is that there is no need
for a second parcel of land-the conservation group holds the usufruct in
the restricted property that is ultimately owned by the owner. A
disadvantage of usufructs is that they usually have a limited duration and
cannot be the basis of a long term conservation solution. Moreover, a
usufruct may give the transferee conservation group far more rights than
necessary (e,g., possession) and responsibilities (e.g., maintenance of the
property) than are required to achieve conservation goals.
V. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN OTHER COMMON
LAW JURISDICTIONS
There are a number of common law jurisdictions that have
adopted conservation easement statutes that contain some or even many
features of the American model.254 Many are former British colonies,
which is ironic, as England itself still prohibits easements in gross, does
not allow covenants in gross to run,255 and has not enacted conservation
easement legislation.
Two civil law jurisdictions-Louisiana and Quebec-have also
adopted conservation "easement" legislation. These jurisdictions are
Commercial Law: International Uniformity and Economic Development, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
709, n.56 (2009).
250 AN. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 37, citing Greek Civil Code art. 1166.
251 A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 37, citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 567 (transferor
responsible for violations of transferee) and German Civil Code allowing transfer with usufructs
granted to juridical persons; see Thailand Civil and Commercial Code § 1422, discussed in
STAVORN, supra note 141.
252 Compare A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 154, § 168 (owner may transfer but not free of the
usufruct) with Swift et al., supra note 143, at 29 (usufruct does not bind subsequent owners).
253 Swift et al., supra note 143, at 29, 139 (describing a usufruct in cloud forest as part of the Mayan
Biosphere Reserve in Guatemala).
254 Ironically, England has not adopted such legislation and would not permit "classical" private
conservation easements because of in gross prohibitions. See supra Part IV.C; Town and
Country Planning Act of 1990, § 106 (government can hold a type of conservation easement by
way of a restriction enforceable by government recorded against land as part of granting an
approval in the planning (i.e., zoning) process).
255 See supra Part IV.C.
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noteworthy as they exist in federations of states or provinces that
otherwise follow the common law. These statutes indicate how at least
two jurisdictions attempted to integrate a common law vehicle into an
essentially civil law model, and the choices they made.
A. AFRICAN COUNTRIES
A number of African countries have adopted legislation
providing for conservation easements of some type. For example, like the
American model, Uganda permits perpetual,256 in gross 257 "environmental
easements" for various purposes including preservation of flora and
fauna, view, ecological and physical features, open space, and water
quality.258 The Ugandan environmental easement is not consensual,
however, as the easement is created not by agreement of the parties but
by a decision of a court on the application of a "person or group of
persons."259 The applicant is required to compensate the landowner for
the lost value of the use of the land,26 0 though the government may pay
the compensation if the easement is of national importance.26 ' This
nonconsensual creation diverges from the spirit and provisions of the
American model. It carries the baggage of all compulsory takings, but
perhaps may be worse as it is initiated by private parties (not
government) and made effective by the judiciary (not the legislature)
without the requirement of a carefully determined plan.262 Kenya263 in
1999 adopted an environmental easement statute virtually identical to the
Ugandan legislation, and Tanzania in 2004 passed a statute with many of
the same features.2 6
256 Uganda National Environmental Act, Ch. 153, § 72(3) (enacted 1995), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file id=180968.
257 Id. § 72(6).
258 Id. § 72(4).
259 Id. §§ 73(1), 74(1).
260 Id. § 76(1), (3).
261 Id. § 76(4).
262 See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
263 Kenya Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act (1999) §§ 112-16, available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klrapp/frames.php.
264 Tanzania Environmental Management Act of 2004 §§ 156-60, available at http://www.lead-
joumal.org/content/07290.pdf.
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B. CANADA
Canadian provinces have adopted private conservation easement
enabling legislation.265 These statutes generally resemble the American
model by specifically providing for nonprofit ownership,266 in gross
interests, 267 perpetual ownership if desired by the parties,2 68 and typical
environmental preservation purposes.269 Like the American model, there
is no requirement of government approval in creation of a conservation
easement held by an NPO. On the termination and modification issue,
the statutes sometimes exhibit mixed signals. For example, the Nova
Scotia legislation attempts to ensure the viability of conservation
easements to a greater extent than other easements or covenants by
expressly stating that conservation easements do not lapse solely by
reason of non-enforcement, change in the use of the servient land, or
changed conditions in the surrounding land.270 At the same time, though,
the legislation permits the court to grant to the servient owner or "Her
Majesty" any relief or remedy available at common law.27' Such
language might be applied to allow the government to seek modification
of a conservation easement if and when the public interest requires, so
providing needed flexibility into a perpetual private conservation
arrangement.
C. AUSTRALIA
Some Australian states have adopted legislation that permits a
conservation covenant held by a specific conservation trust created in the
265 See generally Arlene J. Kwasniak, Conservation Easements: Pluses and Pitfalls, Generally and
For Municipalities, 46 ALTA L. REV. 651 (2009).
266 See, e.g., R.S.O., c. 28, § 3(f) (1990); R.S.N.B., c. C-16.3, § 5 (1998); R.S.S., c. C-27.01, § 6
(1996).
267 See, e.g., R.S.N.B., c. C-16.3, § 2(4) (1998); R.S.N.S., c. 28, § 6 (2001); R.S.S., c. C-27.01, §
3(3) (1996).
268 See, e.g., R.S.N.B., c. C-16.3, § 2(2) (1998); R.S.N.S., c. 28, § 5(1) (2001); R.S.S., c. C-27.01, §
3(2) (1996).
269 See, e.g., R.S.N.B., c. C-16.3, § 3 (1998); R.S.N.S., c. 28, § 4(c) (2001); R.S.O., c. 28, § 3(2)
(1990); R.S.S. c. C-27.01, § 4 (1996).
270 R.S.N.S., c. 28, § 12 (2001); see also R.S.N.B., c. 28, § 10(5) (1998) (providing for assignment
of conservation easement to government in the event the original holder dies or ceases to operate,
thus preserving the benefit of the conservation easement); R.S.O., c. 28, §§ 4.2, 4.3 (1990)
(barring amendment or release of a conservation easement without Ministerial approval, thus
preventing the loss to the public of valuable rights).
271 R.S.N.S., c. 28, §§ 15(2)(a), 2(1)(f) (2001) (defining "owner); see also R.S.N.B., c. C-16.3, §
10(1)(b) (1998) (providing for termination on application of servient owner if continuation of
conservation easement would produce a severe hardship); R.S.S., c. C-27.01, § 10(1)(b) (same).
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statute.272 Thus, there is no authorization for nonprofits generally to hold
conservation restrictions. A government official appoints the members of
the statutory conservation trust, thereby placing the trust under a degree
of governmental control.2"3 The conservation restriction is therefore not
fully a "private" interest.
There is significant governmental involvement in the operation
and administration of Australian conservation covenants. A government
official must approve acquisition, amendment, and release of a covenant,
after a period of public input.274 This has benefits, in that it ensures that
the restrictions serve public conservation goals and prevents the release
of beneficial covenants; the costs, though, are the introduction of
potential red tape and the loss of nonprofit initiative. One interesting
provision states that when the parties are unable to agree on the release
of a covenant, "the matter shall be determined by" a governmental
official.275 Again, this is a double-edged sword as it addresses the
perpetuity problem by providing flexibility but potentially weakens
conservation goals.
D. HYBRIDS: LOUISIANA AND QUEBEC
Louisiana and Quebec present interesting examples, as they are
primarily civil law jurisdictions within a federal system comprised of
other entities following the common law. Both Louisiana and Quebec
have adopted statutes allowing NPOs to participate in conservation
efforts, though Quebec's solution is less similar to the model used in the
United States and the other Canadian provinces. These civil code
regimes have modified the common law model, apparently to fit other
facets of their legal systems.276
In 1986, Louisiana added a statue providing for a "conservation
servitude" that is substantively consistent with many of the provisions of
272 See, e.g., New South Wales Nature Conservation Trust Act of 2001 § 33; New South Wales
National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1974 §69B; Victorian Conservation Trust Act of 1972 § 3A.
Other Australian states have conservation covenant programs where a governmental entity,
rather than a trust, is the covenantee. See ROMY GREINER, DANIEL GREGG & OWEN MILLER,
CONSERVATION COVENANTS AND CONSERVATION MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS IN THE NT: A
PASTORIALISTS' PERSPECTIVE 4-7 (2008), available at http://www.riverconsulting.com.au/
reports/NT CCs-CMAs Final-Report 2008.pdf.
273 New South Wales Nature Conservation Trust Act § 18; Victorian Conservation Trust Act § 4.
274 See Victorian Conservation Trust Act §§ 3A(3), (5), (6), (80); New South Wales Nature
Conservation Trust Act §§ 30, 31(l)(b), 34(2).
275 Victorian Conservation Trust Act § 3A(4).
276 See Kenneth G.C. Reid, The Idea of Mixed Legal Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 8 (2003)
(describing Louisiana and Quebec as "mixed" civil law and common law jurisdictions).
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the Uniform Conservation Easement Act: conservation servitudes are
unlimited in duration unless the document provides otherwise, they can
be held by NPOs, and they are enforceable like other servitudes.277
Interestingly, there is no specific authorization of in gross ownership,
leaving one to wonder whether the general Louisiana Code requirement
of appurtenancy would apply to conservation servitudes.278 If in gross
ownership is in fact barred, Louisiana would lack a key feature of the
American conservation easement model.
Quebec contemplates more governmental involvement than even
Louisiana, let alone other Canadian provinces. A nonprofit can apply
jointly with a landowner for recognition of the owner's land as a "nature
reserve."2 79 The agreement must indicate the conservation measures that
the owner will undertake, as well as permitted and prohibited activities.280
Presumably, these could be like restrictions in conservation easements.
This agreement can last in perpetuity, or for a lesser period.28' Unlike
almost all conservation easement statutes, however, the Minister must
approve the nature reserve agreement in order for it to be valid.282
Similarly, the Minister must approve amendments and the Minister may
terminate a nature reserve initiative on the Minister's own initiative if
certain conditions are met.283 While this article has explored the potential
benefits of some increased governmental involvement in some situations
involving conservation easements, the Quebec approach may threaten the
vibrancy of NPO activities in conservation.
CONCLUSION
Nation states residing in our global community face difficult
choices on the allocation and utilization of their limited, valuable land.
Governmental entities can accomplish a great deal in conserving these
resources. There is a role, however, for private organizations in the
preservation effort. One relatively recent, successful, and game changing
conservation device in the United States has been the in gross
conservation easement acquired and stewarded by a nonprofit
organization. This article has suggested that other countries may find that
277 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1271-76 (2011).
278 See supra note 162 & accompanying text.
279 Natural Heritage Conservation Act, R.S.Q. c. C-61.01, § 54.
280 Id. § 55.
281 Id. § 54.
282 Id. §§ 57, 60.
283 Id. §§ 60-63.
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some type of private conservation restriction is a helpful tool. But before
so concluding, it is essential that a nation examine its own unique
culture, history, and aspirations to determine if such a private device is
suitable for it. Then the country can devise a legal structure, consistent
with local law, for the type of restriction that will best meet the country's
policy goals. It is far more likely that conservation efforts will succeed
following this strategy, rather than through the unthinking imposition of
an unfamiliar American-style conservation easement.
